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Illegal cross-border activity is a severe homeland defense and security problem 
along the international Southwest border.  The issue of illegal human smuggling is not 
new to the United States-Mexico border or to law enforcement agencies; however, the 
phenomenon is rising and human smugglers are adjusting to law enforcement tactics.  
This thesis has three objectives.  First, it describes and identifies the fundamental 
dimensions of U.S. Border Patrol operations in the busiest, most vulnerable section of the 
border.  Second, it integrates prominent border security factors into a mathematical 
predictive model -- the Arizona-Sonora Border (ASB) Model – that provides an 
illustration of possible border security operational strategies and the outcome 
apprehension probability of migrants given the implementation of various operational 
strategies.  Last, this thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive picture of the complex 
dynamics along the USBP Tucson Sector.  This picture highlights the primary challenges 
facing policymakers in developing innovative policies that will minimize illegal cross-
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For decades, the United States federal government has developed and 
implemented border security strategies to counter illegal cross-border activity. While 
some strategies have alleviated the influx of illegal immigration to certain geographic 
areas, increased border control in these locations have made other less controlled areas of 
the border more vulnerable.  Rising crime rates, discarded debris, increased apprehension 
rates, and growing public scrutiny in these less secure areas provide clear evidence that 
border security is a social, economic, and a national security issue.  Yet, despite the 
border security efforts of the Bush Administration and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), the problem persists and continues to worsen, particularly along the 
Arizona-Sonora border (ASB). 
The issue of illegal cross-border activity is not new to the United States-Mexico 
border (USMB), and specifically to the law enforcement agencies in these regions. More 
importantly, the phenomenon is expanding as smugglers and traffickers adjust to the law 
enforcement tactics to counter it.  Bandits are driven by financial gain, and generally 
ignore the burden their activities impose upon local communities.  From a homeland 
security and defense perspective, terrorists with weapons of mass destruction could 
possibly penetrate the porous border in much the same way that unauthorized migrants 
and contraband does.1  Developing strategies that could result in a solution to the 
problem of illegal cross-border activity along the USMB is of critical importance in 
securing the homeland. 
Various agencies at all levels of government have an integral part in securing the 
homeland.  The most important stakeholder in border security is the U.S. Border Patrol 
(USBP), whose mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the 
country.2  However, while clearly playing a critical role, law enforcement is not the sole 
bearer of this responsibility.  As demonstrated by the efforts of certain faith-based 
                                                
1 Although there is no evidence of such occurring, the probability does exist. 
2 Robert C. Bonner, “National Border Patrol Strategy:  Message from the Commissioner” 
(Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol and the Office of Policy 
and Planning, September 2004). 
2 
organizations, other non-government entities can also make an important contribution.     
Cultural patterns along the USMB also influence U.S. policies and contribute to the 
effectiveness of border security strategies. 
 
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis has three objectives.  First, it describes and identifies the fundamental 
dimensions of U.S. Border Patrol operations in the busiest, most vulnerable section of the 
border.  The research provides a workable definition of key concepts related to border 
security, identifies the principal stakeholders and jurisdictional authorities along the 
Southwest international border, and reviews contemporary border security strategies and 
border security operations from 1993 to 2004.  Much of the focus is on the USBP Tucson 
Sector.  The Tucson Sector accounts for 43 percent of the Nation’s illegal apprehensions 
– clearly the busiest area of the U.S. perimeter.3  This section also identifies the current 
USBP Tucson Sector operational structure, currently employed border security resources 
and infrastructure, illegal border-crossers (IBC) modus operandi, and the most frequently 
used and known illegal crossing routes into the USBP Tucson Sector. 
The second objective is to integrate prominent border security factors into a 
mathematical predictive model -- the Arizona-Sonora Border (ASB) Model – that 
provides an illustration of possible border security operational strategies and the outcome 
apprehension probability of migrants given the implementation of various operational 
strategies.  The model generates information about current USBP tactics used to counter 
the “balloon effect,”4 which is observed when applying force to the ASB.  Specifically, 
this model provides a much more rigorous thinking process to help develop operations 
that maximize efficiency in a border security system. 
 
                                                
3 U.S. Border Patrol, “Apprehension Statistics 1993 -2004:  Data Presented in Actual Numbers and as 
a Percentage of Total Southwest Apprehensions,” (http://www.lawg.org/docs/apprehension%20stats.pdf 
accessed June 20, 2005). 
4 “Balloon effect” is used by border security experts to explain the impact phenomenon of applying 
force to the international boundary.  For example, when you apply force at one location an influx of illegal 
cross-border activity will relocate around the enforced area, as if the enforced area is an impenetrable 
bubble that one must go around. 
3 
Third, the thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive picture of the complex 
dynamics along the USBP Tucson Sector.  This picture highlights the primary challenges 
facing policymakers in developing innovative policies that will minimize illegal cross-
border activity.  These challenges range in reaching across disciplines and jurisdictions to 
the cultural, law enforcement and humanitarian concerns that illegal immigration bring to 
the USMB. 
Illegal human smuggling and trafficking pose serious criminal problem along the 
international Southwest border and can potentially threaten national security.  However, 
the issues of illegal human smuggling and trafficking are not new nor are they unique to 
the USMB.  The U.S. shares approximately 5,500 miles of international border with 
Canada and an additional 2,000 miles with Mexico.  Both of these international 
boundaries include bodies of water and rugged terrain, which make it difficult to secure 
the international region from people illegally entering the U.S.  Consequently, individuals 
who cannot enter our nation legally opt to pay human smugglers to guide them on their 
journey to U.S. soil. 
Interpol recognizes that “[s]muggling networks seem to focus more and more on 
Central and South America where they maintain the necessary links to Mexican people 
smugglers in order to move the illegal migrants via Mexico to North America.”5  
Likewise, the CBP identified over seventy-two Other-Than-Mexican (OTM) nationals 
who cross the USMB, including citizens from countries identified by the U.S. State 
Department as state sponsors of terrorism.6  Arguably as the U.S. government adds 
security measures to ports of entry (POE) and enforces immigration laws, more people, 
including terrorists, employ illegal border-crossing services to enter the U.S.  With the 
implementation of additional security measures or barriers to entry, terrorists may seek 
funding or assistance to infiltrate U.S. borders from illegal smugglers or “coyotes” as 
they are known along the border. 
                                                
5 Interpol, “People Smuggling,” December 6, 2004, 
(http://www.interpol.int/public/THB/PeopleSmuggling/Default.asp, accessed December 6, 2004). 
6 Kevin Stephens, US Border Patrol, “Plan Arizona and Proposed US Border Patrol Projects 
Presentation” (Tucson, AZ:  Borderland Management Task Force Meeting, March 4, 2004). 
4 
Coyotes may begin to use financing tactics similar to those used by those 
involved in drug trafficking to support terrorist groups and their objectives.  The financial 
tactics of Coyotes parallel the tactics of those involved in narco-terrorism, where the 
funding of terrorist activities comes from monies acquired from drug trafficking.  The 
Council on Foreign Relations noted that “[m]ore funds reportedly come from illegal 
activities conducted by al-Qaeda or on its behalf, including smuggling, drug trafficking, 
and illicit trade.”7  If illegal human smuggling becomes a funding source for terrorism, 
then one can argue that illegal smuggling constitutes a form of terrorism.  Given the 
above criteria, law enforcement must recognize this new form of terrorism as “smuggler-
terrorism.” If law enforcement fails to recognize the shift in Coyotes tactics, the current 
border insecurity situation will become a greater national security dilemma.  The ASB 
model can be modified to integrate these types of changes in IBCs tactics.  Integrating 
these changes into the model serves as a thinking tool to identify operational plans to 
combat these shifts before the problem becomes of national significance. 
Post-September 11, 2001 border security strategies became part of a greater 
national vision of protecting the homeland from potential entry of terrorists and weapons 
of mass destruction.  However, this notion that became of greater public concern after 
9/11 was already on the minds of several political leaders, such as Texas Congressman 
Lamar Smith, who stated, “[o]ne of the most dangerous threats to our national security is 
the risk of a terrorist crossing our […] border undetected.  This happened in 1997 when 
Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer crossed the Northern Border and attempted to blow up the New 
York subway system.”8  As was then reinforced in the National Homeland Security 
Strategy viewing border security as a national critical mission area.9  The traditional 
concerns of illegal cross-border activity of rising crime in border communities; drain on 
social resources, economic concerns was augmented by the fear of another terrorist attack  
                                                
7 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Money: Drying Up the Funds for Terror,” 
http://www.cfrterrorism.org/responses/money.html (accessed December 6, 2004). 
8 Lamar Smith (U.S. House of Representatives), Opening statement to the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Drug Smuggling, Illegal Immigration and Terrorism on The 
Border between the United States and Canada, April 14, 1999, 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/smit0414.htm (accessed December 6, 2004). 
9 Office of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for Homeland Security” (Washington D.C., July 
2002), 22. 
5 
on U.S. soil.  Arizona Senator Kyl posed on August 27, 2004, “Why wouldn’t those 
seeking to attack America be tempted to join the hundreds of thousands already illegally 
entering from Mexico?”10 
With these new security challenges in mind, President Bush, President Fox and 
Prime Minister Martin signed on March 23, 2005 the Security and Prosperity Partnership 
(SPP) of North America, a tri-national joint statement on a common security strategy.  
The SPP is a cooperative agreement between Canada, Mexico and the United States to 
protect North America from any foreign threat, secure our shared borders by streamlining 
the efficient movement of goods and low-risk travelers through our borders.11  This 
agreement provides a common security strategy to bolster economic growth, 
competitiveness and the quality of life in North America. 
Understanding the complex dynamics of the USMB and identifying how to 
maximize border security efforts represent a fundamental capability for policymakers 
who seek to build a new doctrine of homeland security to achieve an efficient common 
security strategy.  This all-encompassing understanding, however, includes an 
appreciation of the way in which illegal crossings of the borders generate widespread 
chaos, much of which does not rise to the level of a national security threat, but which 
provides a fertile context for those risks to take root and flourish.  For instance, illegal 
border crossings generate violent crimes in local communities and against IBCs 
attempting to enter the U.S. will decrease (i.e., assault, rape, murder, kidnappings, etc.), 
thereby alleviating hospital resources in the Southwest.  Moreover, by reducing illegal 
immigration, border communities will experience a decrease in crime and a subsequent 
improvement in quality of life.  By encouraging the U.S. government to identify resource 
inefficiencies and reallocate these accordingly along the ASB.  Additionally, the U.S. 
economy would benefit by disrupting a black market of untaxed revenues created by the 
revenues sent to foreign countries to support migrant families.  Ultimately, the U.S. 
government would effectively identify the entry of people, goods and services that cross                                                 
10 Senator Jon Kyl, “Arizona: a ‘Terrorist Corridor?’,” The Arizona Conservative, Guest Opinion, 
August 27, 2004, http://www.azconservative.org/Kyl_TerrorismCorridor.htm (accessed December 6, 
2004). 
11 The White House, “Fact Sheet on the Security and Prosperity Partnership on North America” 
(Washington D.C.: Press Secretary Office, March 23, 2005), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323-4.html (accessed January 11, 2006). 
6 
the nation’s border: all important factors in furthering the National Homeland Security 
Strategy and the SPP.   It is important to note that the mathematical model offered in this 
thesis with minor modifications can be applied to the entire U.S.–Mexico international 
boundary. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
The methodology used for this thesis is a mixture of a general qualitative analysis 
of policy options and specific modeling of the USBP operations in the Tucson Sector.  
The intention is to create, with the assistance of the Naval Postgraduate School staff, a 
model that allows for the simulation of various scenarios to identify the impact of 
different operational deployment and employment of border security resources in order to 
minimize illegal cross-border activity prior to implementing policies.  This model 
integrates existing border security initiatives and provides information for planning new 
border control strategies and policies.  Specifically, this model focuses on the ASB, the 
Tucson Sector, and designs the “border” using current USBP layers of defense strategy 
with identified known illegal entry routes to the USBP Tucson Sector.12  This “border” 
allows the assessments to be as accurate as the possible, given the current border security 
system and the border’s current situation.  Then, the model itself is analyzed to ensure 
applicability, with small modifications, to other areas of the border.  This, in turn, 
predicts the border control effectiveness of various border security strategies given illegal 
cross-border migration patterns, while offering actionable recommendations to secure the 
USMB. 
The research plan incorporates information from two types of sources:  the U.S. 
government, Mexican officials and community leaders. First, U.S. government sources 
include documents and personnel interviews.  U.S. government documents, from 1993 to 
present, provide an overview of contemporary border security strategies and policies for 
the current directives of countering illegal activity along the Southwest international 
border. In addition, the author interviewed USBP to provide information regarding 
                                                
12 This information was obtained by the author through various interviews with USBP agents, 
Mexican Grupo Beta agents, community leaders and border community residents, in addition to touring 
various locations on both sides of the Arizona-Sonora border. 
7 
operational structure, deployment of resources and infrastructure along the ASB. Second, 
Mexican sources include documents and personnel interviews from Mexican officials and 
community leaders to provide an understanding of the avenues of approach used by 
human and drug smugglers to enter the U.S. illegally. 
The information provided through this research will be incorporated into the 
“border” model to illustrate potential shortfalls in U.S. border security strategies and 
facilitate policymakers to develop more effective recommendations to the current 
national strategies.  This model allows strategists to simulate different scenarios and think 
of innovative strategies to prevent illegal cross-border activity that are most effective 
given the most current intelligence analysis of migration.  The scope of this model is to 
demonstrate that a predictable analysis of the ASB is feasible and can be used to improve 
national border security tactics and, develop potential scenarios prior to the 
implementation of future strategies. 
 
C. OPERATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS 
This thesis analyzes current border security operational procedures and provides 
new recommendations to secure the USMB.  In an effort to capture the most accurate 
assessment for current international issues, the author focuses on USBP’s operational 
policies during the past decade.  This policy review provides a comprehensive picture of 
the strategy USBP employs to deter illegal cross-border activity, which in turn identifies 
parameters and variables for the development of a “border” model.  This model will 
provide an operational picture to optimally deploy border security resources to counter 
illegal cross-border activity.  The operational policies under consideration all involve the 
philosophy of “prevention through deterrence” with a force multiplier of border security 
resources.  They are as follows: 
Operation Hold-the-Line – The USBP implemented an El Paso, Texas Border 




Operation Gatekeeper – The USBP implemented a California - Baja California 
Border crackdown in 1994 and has steadily increased its resources in that region ever 
since. This initiative entailed more than ten years of constantly adding force, 
infrastructure, and resources to the border. 
Operation Safeguard – The USBP implemented a Nogales Border crackdown in 
1999.  This operation steadily increased resources in Nogales. 
Arizona Border Control Initiative – The DHS has implemented this strategic 
operational initiative in 2004 along the ASB.  This initiative created partnerships with 
law enforcement agencies at all levels of government and added more personnel on the 
ground, and technological surveillance measures. 
Operation Stonegarden – The DHS implemented this initiative to provide 
resources to local, Tribal and State law enforcement agencies to assist with border 
security efforts.  This operation is ongoing and concurrent with the Arizona Border 
Control Initiative. 
An analysis of the counter illegal immigration process and the policies that guide 
the border security operations along the international USMB will help policymakers 
evaluate different approaches to securing the border.  In turn, this evaluation will lead to 
decisions about new and different approaches to border control, immigration and 
homeland security, including a proposed predictive model to assist policymakers and 
operational planners in the USBP Tucson Sector.  The next chapter will provide an 













II. BORDER SECURITY OVERVIEW 
Prior to 9/11, the USBP security efforts along the international border were well 
established.  Since then, however, the constant flow of unauthorized migrants and “[t]he 
increasing mobility and destructive potential of modern terrorism has required the United 
States to rethink and rearrange fundamentally its systems for border […] security.” 13 
This critical need to rethink border systems, particularly along the Southwest border, 
leads critics to ponder, who is primarily responsible for securing our borders?  What is 
the USBP doing to secure the border given this new threat?  This chapter will answer 
these questions for the benefit of policymakers by providing a comprehensive overview 
and framework of the current border security system.  With this information, they will be 
able to better assess and re-evaluate current operational plans; develop and implement 
new border strategies; and increase efficiency by redeploying scarce resources. 
 
A. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
For purposes of this thesis, the definition established by the 1983 La Paz 
Agreement between the U.S. and Mexico, which defined the international border between 
the countries, will be used to articulate functional definitions.  The “border” refers to the 
geopolitical divide between the U.S. and Mexico.  However, for this thesis, the “border” 
is specifically the international border between the State of Arizona, U.S. and the State of 
Sonora, Mexico.  The 377-mile ASB is a portion of one of the world’s busiest 
international boundaries, and as such, an overwhelming number of cross-border illegal 
and legal activities occur daily. 
Although there is a geo-political border, a full understanding of the complexities 
and dynamics of the ASB requires recognition and analysis of the communities on both 
sides of the border.  The economic dependency, environmental and cultural ties between 
these border communities adds a multifaceted dynamic and dimension to understanding 
the ASB. This cultural, social, and economic region has received recognition from 
governments and the public; therefore, to encompass these intrinsic interdependencies, 
                                                
13 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C., July 
2002), 21. 
10 
the term “border region” was officially recognized in 1983.  Border region includes 100 
kilometers (67 miles) north and south of the geopolitical divide between the U.S. and 
Mexico.14  The border region has a population of approximately three million people, and 
it continues to grow exponentially as compared to the national average of both the U.S. 
and Mexico.15  This includes all of the cities, town, communities, tribes, and counties 
within this area, which share common challenges. 
The enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
strengthens the U.S. and Mexico global trading partners relationship.  Likewise, the 
State of Arizona and Sonora have a long history of binational partnerships, where 
Sonora is Arizona’s largest trading partner, representing $13 billion in trade in 2003 
and a global gateway for both legal and illegal flows of people, goods and services.16  
From a homeland security perspective, the State of Sonora is also the geographic 
first “line of defense” for the State of Arizona.  As terrorists attempt to enter the U.S. 
illegally through the ASB, law enforcement efforts in Sonora can assist to prevent 
these individuals from successful entry, and as a result must be a strong partner in 
homeland security efforts.  As directed in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, “the United States will work with traditional allies and new friends to win 
the war on terrorism.”17  Homeland security in this region requires the thorough 
cooperation of communities and governments on both sides of the border.  Risk from 
terrorism, certainly, and from all-hazards that occur on one side of the border have a 
direct, immediate impact on the other side.  Border communities in Arizona, Sonora, 
and elsewhere along the border are vital binational partners in the fight for security.  
Therefore, this region must be considered as one common population on two sides of an 
                                                
14 La Paz Agreement defined the border region as 100 km north and 100 km south of the U.S.-Mexico 
International border.  See “La Paz Agreement,” Text of the La Paz Agreement, including Annex I-V.  
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oia/MexUSA.nsf/La+Paz+Agreement+-+Web?OpenView&ExpandView, August 
14, 1983. 
15 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Estimates of the Population for Counties of Arizona: April 1, 
2000 to July 1, 2004 (CO-EST2004-01-04) (Washington D.C.:  the Population Division, U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2005), and El Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Geográfica e Informática (the Mexican Bureau of 
Statistics, Geography and Computer Science), Estadísticas de Población por Estado (Population Statistics 
by State), 2000. 
16 General Consulate of Mexico, “Economic Impact of the Mexico-Arizona Relationship” (Phoenix, 
AZ:  Thunderbird Mexican Association, Academic Research Project, May 2003), 1. 
17 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 60. 
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international boundary, recognizing that natural or man-made disasters do not distinguish 
between geopolitical boundaries.  Thus, the terms “homeland security” and “border 
security” are used interchangeably throughout this thesis in reference to securing the ASB 
region. 
 
B. WHO’S IN CHARGE? 
Pre-9/11 immigration services and enforcement were within the organizational 
structure of the U.S. Department of Justice as the Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS).  The USBP, a unit within the INS enforced illegal immigration between 
the POEs.  The National Homeland Security Strategy restates the law that all entry and 
exit to the U.S. must be conducted through a designated POE with the appropriate 
documentation.18  However, tighter immigration laws, singularly focused enforcement 
efforts, and greater restrictions on the legal entry foreign nationals cause many border 
crossers (i.e., laborers, human smugglers, drug smugglers, and potential security 
violators) to enter the U.S. illegally through international borders. 
9/11 brought a new dimension to the problem of illegal immigration with 
potential terrorists seeking to enter the country, thereby elevating border security to a 
national priority.  The U.S. government responded to 9/11 with the creation of the DHS, a 
department tasked with “preventing the U.S. from a terrorist attack, reducing American’s 
vulnerability to terrorism and minimizing the damage and recovery from attacks that do 
occur.”19  DHS was created under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and merged 
twenty-two agencies into one department and one mission.  One of the newly created 
directorates was Border and Transportation Security, which abolished the INS and 
divided its functions among CIS, ICE, US Coast Guard and CBP.  While these units 
continue to exist with the DHS, the directorate of Border and Transportation Security was 
recently disbanded by Secretary Chertoff in July 2005.  Now, CIS processes legal 
immigration services and enforces illegal immigration as well as the US Coast Guard, 
ICE, and CBP.  The duties of illegal immigration enforcement are further divided 
between ICE and CBP:  ICE enforces immigration law within the interior of the U.S. and 
                                                
18 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 21. 
19 Ibid, vii. 
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CBP, USBP enforces and protects the U.S. border.  The goal in integrating customs 
inspectors, immigration inspectors and agricultural inspectors under CBP was to provide 
one face at the border and one comprehensive strategy with a unity of force.  However, 
USBP although a unit of CBP, remains distinct, with its own mission and force. 
Under the auspices of a new directorate, the priority mission of the USBP is 
homeland security, defined as “nothing less than preventing terrorists and terrorist 
weapons – including potential weapons of mass destruction – from entering the United 
States.”20  The priority mission functionally establishes and maintains operational control 
of the U.S. border between the ports of entry.  On the other hand, it is CBP’s mission to 
control the U.S. border as a whole.  9/11 expanded the traditional mission to the 
prevention of terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S. in addition to 
“interdicting illegal aliens and drugs and those who attempt to smuggle them across our 
borders.”21  The USBP’s area of operation and responsibility is between land and sea 
POEs, which extends across 7,000 miles of border with Canada and Mexico and 2,000 
miles of coastal borders.  By law and the National Border Patrol Strategy, CBP is the 
authoritative law enforcement agency charged to protect the nation’s borders and ensure 
that the U.S. is not penetrated by terrorists, unauthorized migrants, human smugglers, 
human traffickers, drug smugglers and contraband. 22 
 
C. USBP ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW 
When the DHS reorganized USBP, it divided the U.S. into 21 sectors of operation 
for practical managerial reasons, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                                
20 Robert C. Bonner, “National Border Patrol Strategy:  Message from the Commissioner” 
(Washington D.C.:  U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol and the Office of Policy 
and Planning, September 2004). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Labor Appropriation Act 1924 established the U.S. Border Patrol in response to rising illegal entries 
particularly along land borders. 
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Figure 1.   Map of the U.S. Border Patrol Sectors 
 
(From: Honor First, unofficial U.S. Border Patrol website created by U.S. Border Patrol 
Agents, http://www.honorfirst.com/stationlist.htm [accessed August 15, 2005]). 
 
While the USBP patrols both the Northern and Southern border, ninety percent of 
USBP resources are deployed along the USMB because it is considered the focal point 
for illegal immigration with ninety-seven percent of all illegal alien apprehensions.23  The 
four border states along the USMB are divided into nine USBP Sectors:  San Diego and 
El Centro, California; Yuma and Tucson, Arizona; El Paso (New Mexico and two 
counties in Texas); Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo and McAllen, Texas.  While these four states 
share a geopolitical and geo-physical border with Mexico, they do not share the same 
topography, climate or challenges.  The USBP faces the challenge of developing different 
operational tactics and techniques for each sector. 
Tucson Sector represents forty-three percent of the total annual Southwest 
USBP’s apprehensions.24  This percentage indicates that most of the illegal cross-border 
activity occurs within 262 miles of the total 2,000 miles of international border with 
Mexico.25  Table 1 indicates that in the past decade the Tucson Sector has become the 
                                                
23 Lisa Seghetti and others, “Border Security and the Southwest Border: Background, Legislation, and 
Issues,” Congressional Research Service (September 28, 2005): 21. 
24 U.S. Border Patrol. “Apprehension Statistics 1993 -2004:  Data Presented in Actual Numbers and as 
a Percentage of Total Southwest Apprehensions,” http://www.lawg.org/docs/apprehension%20stats.pdf 
(accessed June 20, 2005). 
25 The illegal cross-border activity accounted for is the activity that is observed and interdicted. 
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most active in terms of illegal cross-border activity with a significant increase from eight 
percent of the total apprehensions along the Southwest border in 1993 to forty-three 
percent in 2004. 
 
 
Table 1. U.S. Border Patrol Apprehension Statistics 1993 – 2004. 
 
(From: U.S. Border Patrol, “Apprehension Statistics 1993 -2004:  Data Presented in 
Actual Numbers and as a Percentage of Total Southwest Apprehensions,” 
http://www.lawg.org/docs/apprehension%20stats.pdf [accessed June 20, 2005]). 
 
According to the INS, this phenomenon is a tactical dimension of the INS’ 
National Strategic Plan, which accounts for various ways to control the influx of illegal 
immigration in the concentrated border areas of San Diego and El Paso.  The INS focused 
enforcement efforts in San Diego and El Paso; the intention was to shift migrants outside 
of the urban area, thereby shifting the migrants to more open areas, a strategic and 
tactical intention of INS.  The intention was not to shift migrants into different 
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jurisdictions.  The intent of this strategy was to continue shifting the migrants and 
breaking up criminal networks by gaining control in the less secure areas overtime.  As 
indicated by the USBP Chief David Aguilar, “[h]istorically, major CBP Border Patrol 
initiatives, such as Operation Hold the Line, Operation Gatekeeper, and Operation Rio 
Grande in our El Paso, San Diego, and McAllen Sectors, respectively, have had great 
border enforcement impact on illegal migration patterns along the southwest border, 
proving that a measure of control is possible.  Together, they have laid the foundation for 
newer strategies and enforcement objectives and an ambitious goal to gain control of our 
Nation's borders, particularly our border with Mexico.”26 
Border security experts argue that the border security strategy is at a stage where 
the migration flow is concentrated in Arizona.  However, this concentration can be due to 
changes in leadership, administrations and a non-continuous flow of resources to these 
less secure areas, leaving the Tucson Sector as the primary gateway for illegal cross-
border activity along the USMB.  The various border operations mentioned in Chief 
Aguilar’s testimony are part of the first phases of the overall national border security 
strategy developed in the early 1990s.  DHS is developing and implementing new 
strategies, such as the Arizona Border Control Initiative to continue the border security 
strategy’s second phase in minimizing the vulnerabilities along the international border. 
 
D. CONTEMPORARY BORDER SECURITY OVERVIEW (1993-2004) 
The review of USBP’s contemporary strategy from 1993 to 2004 will help 
illuminate how these particular USBP strategies led to the current challenges faced by the 
Arizona Tucson Sector.  The build-up of border enforcement along the USMB first 
started in the early 1990s under the Clinton Administration in response to public concern 
about illegal immigration from Mexico and its effect on public services and employment 
in the United States.27  Experts called for a strategy that would simultaneously increase 
tighter enforcement of U.S. immigration laws while NAFTA spurred Mexican economic 
                                                
26 David Aguilar, U.S. Border Patrol Chief, testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations 
and Subcommittee on Homeland Security, July 12, 2005. 
27 Wayne Cornelius, “Controlling ‘Unwanted’ Immigration:  Lessons from the United States, 1993 – 
2004” (San Diego, CA: University of California Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, December 
2004), 2. 
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growth.  Together, both would help reduce the flow of illegal immigration from Mexico 
to the U.S.  Consequently, INS designed several border security strategies to prevent 
illegal cross-border activity.  These strategies derived from a mixture of community 
policing theory and a low-intensity warfare concept.  The challenges along the border 
were concentrated and the need to protect the international border from illegal entry 
caused border security experts to research and implement new theories.  Border security 
strategies focused on deterrence by deploying large numbers of border patrol agents, 
increasing the hours of actual border patrolling, and enhancing border security 
technology.  These resources were deployed to strategically designated areas of the 
Southwest border with the greatest number of crime and disorder.  During this period, the 
San Diego and El Paso sector represented the gateways used by 70-80 percent of the 
unauthorized migrants entering the U.S.28 The strategy made sense and the demand for 
federal response resulted in the implementation of this strategy with the greatest border 
security funding appropriation in U.S. history. 
Rather than spread the resources across the entire USMB, the INS “concentrated 
border enforcement strategies” were implemented in four specific segments of the 
international border:  Operation Hold-the-Line in El Paso, Texas in 1993, Operation 
Gatekeeper in San Diego in 1994, Operation Rio Grande for South Texas in 1997, and 
Operation Safeguard in central Arizona in 1995.29  These strategies were developed with 
the intention of increasing the USBP’s probability of apprehension to a level that would 
deter potential migrants from crossing into El Paso or San Diego.  Eventually, the intent 
was for border crossers to “spread the word” on the difficulty of entering the U.S. without 
being apprehended to potential migrants and deter them from leaving their hometowns in 
Mexico and other countries. 
Operation Safeguard began operations in 1999 in Nogales, Arizona.  It was not 
until 1999 when USBP in Arizona began to participate in the concentrated border 
enforcement strategy.  Some experts argue that this was because Arizona contains 
extensive natural hazards, which were perceived as a deterrent to migrants attempting a 
clandestine entry into the U.S.  As stated in Wayne Cornelius’ article, former INS 
                                                
28 Cornelius, “Controlling ‘Unwanted’ Immigration,” 6. 
29 The majority of resources for Operation Safeguard did not arrive until 1999. 
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Commissioner Doris Meissner believed no one would risk their lives to illegally cross the 
border in areas of formidable mountains and extreme desert temperatures.30  Essentially, 
“Mother Nature” would take care of USBP’s responsibility.  However, experts were 
incorrect about their assumption as seen by the significant loss of life by many migrants 
attempting to cross in these geographically desolate areas.31 
Roughly ten years after the implementation of the INS Strategic Plan, border 
security still remains a critical national mission.  Throughout this entire period, the U.S. 
has increased funding into immigration control and border security initiatives, however 
still deem inadequate to meet the new mission post-9/11.  Our nation is still facing a 
steady increase in the number of illegal immigrants residing in our communities with an 
increase in the number of deaths in the desert; both demonstrate that the current border 
enforcement system is flawed.32  According to the Search for International Terrorist 
Entities (SITE) Institute, the border enforcement policy was unsuccessful because 
“despite extensive surveillance, the border remains porous because of the stretches of 
desert it crosses and Mexico's established smuggling networks.”33  However, this premise 
was a component of INS’ National Strategic Plan, yet the border remains insecure.  What 
did INS fail to do in the Tucson Sector to secure our borders? 
In order to determine INS’ shortfalls with regards to the USBP Tucson Sector, it 
is important to provide a historical overview of the INS’ Strategic Plan.  Between 1993 
and 1994, the USBP developed the National Border Patrol Strategy to establish control 
and enforce border security along the USMB.  This strategy was multi-phase, focusing 
first in the El Paso and San Diego Sectors.  The strategy’s main focus was to prevent 
unauthorized migrants from entering the U.S. through deterrence mechanisms.  These 
mechanisms utilized a mixture of resources, which included: technology, extension of 
                                                
30 Cornelius, “Controlling ‘Unwanted’ Immigration,” 6. 
31 Bill Vann, “Five Years of Operation Gatekeeper:  US Border Crackdown Deaths Souring,” 
International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), June 25, 1999,  
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jun1999/ins-j25.shtml (accessed February 26, 2005). 
32 Jeffrey Passel, “Unauthorized Migrants:  Numbers and Characteristics,” Pew Hispanic Center, June 
14, 2005. 
33 Richard B. Schmitt and others, “U.S. Fears Terrorism Via Mexico’s Time-Tested Smuggling 
Routes,” SITE Institute, September 15, 2004, 
http://www.siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=news18904&Category=news&Subcategory=0 (accessed 
December 6, 2004). 
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fencing, and a significant increase of manpower to the El Paso and San Diego urban 
area.34  Efforts commenced with a significant increase of USBP officers presence on the 
border, followed by the creation of a new and improved ten-foot-high steel fence in San 
Diego.  This improved fencing made it more difficult for migrants to tamper with the 
fence and inhibit migrants from illegally entering the U.S.35 Much like before the 
implementation of the concentrated border security strategy, migrants and smugglers 
continued to climb the fence, tamper with the fence by cutting wholes in it or dig tunnels 
under it, but most of it lead to quick apprehension by USBP, causing smugglers and 
migrants to move from well-lit urban areas to more desolated areas to continue their 
travels north.36 
As migrants and smugglers probed the weak areas, the USBP responded by 
closing known tunnels and making it more difficult to climb over the fence by erecting 
vertical extensions angled back into Mexico to create a greater obstacle for migrants to 
climb the fence.  Ten years later, in San Diego, this fence was tripled to create a greater 
obstacle for migrants and smugglers, shifting migrants further east.  Meanwhile, state-of-
the-art remote video surveillance systems connected to motion detectors and seismic 
radars, added by stadium-type lighting were installed along the international fence.  
Additionally, the majority of a USBP agent’s time was consumed with “line-watch” duty.  
Many agents were strategically stationed parallel to the international border to prevent 
entry in this area.  Another technological advancement of this strategy was the 
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), a database that stores the biometric 
photograph and fingerprints identifying all entered apprehended migrants.  This database 
has assisted the USBP with identification and prosecution human smugglers and 
migrants, who are frequent crossers.  This technology was later implemented along the 
entire Southwest border. 
While these border security efforts had a significant impact in the San Diego and 
El Paso Sector, less secure sectors are suffering from the incomplete multi-phase 
                                                
34 Some fencing was already in place prior to the implementation of the National Security Plan, 
however, this plan increased fencing in many areas along the USMB. 
35 Operation Gatekeeper for the San Diego Sector extended the fence into the Pacific Ocean, 
preventing unauthorized migrants from attempting to swim across into the San Diego coastal area. 
36 Cornelius, “Controlling ‘Unwanted’ Immigration,” 7. 
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implementation of the National Border Strategy.  The ASB current border insecurity 
situation is due to the incomplete implementation of the National Border Strategy Phase 
II, long over-due and insufficient resources continue to arrive to the Tucson Sector.  As 
noted above in Table 1, while the San Diego and El Paso sectors continued to establish 
and maintain border security, over time the local apprehension rate began to decrease and 
apprehensions began to increase in less secure border areas, such as the Tucson Sector.  
This measure of impact is important because it was a direct result of the dismantling of 
organized smuggling networks.  The displacement of migrants into less secure sectors is a 
USBP-accepted measure of impact of border control efforts in the San Diego and El Paso 
Sector.37  However, the Tucson Sector apprehension rate continues to increase regardless 
of the supplemental border security resources to the Tucson Sector.  Drawing from 
lessons learned in the San Diego and El Paso sectors, one can deduce that the 
apprehension rates continue to remain high in the Tucson Sector regardless of the 
increase of border security resources because organized smuggling networks continue to 
be strong in this area. 
 
E. USBP TUCSON SECTOR CURRENT BORDER SECURITY 
STRATEGIES 
This section provides an overview of the current border security policies and 
operational structure in the Arizona Tucson Sector.  This overview will provide 
background information as to how the Tucson Sector is attempting to secure the border 
with little success based on USBP’s own measures of impact and effectiveness used in 
the San Diego and El Paso Sectors. 
1. Arizona Border Control Initiative 
With a rise in illegal cross-border activity, Arizona is challenged with rising crime 
rates, environmental concerns from discarded debris, and a diminished quality of life in 
the border region.  In response, DHS Secretary Tom Ridge rolled out the Arizona Border 
Control Initiative (ABCI) in 2004.38  This initiative established four phases to increase 
                                                
37 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Border Control:  Revised Strategy is Showing Positive Results,” 
Washington D.C., December 1994.  
38 Governor Janet Napolitano, “The National Spotlight is on the Arizona Border,” Phoenix News,  
November 30, 2005, http://www.phxnews.com/fullstory.php?article=28861 (accessed December 18, 2005). 
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border enforcement resources, including the addition of border patrol agents to the 
Tucson Sector.  This initiative seeks to accomplish a reduction in the flow of illegal 
migrants while improving the quality of life in the border region.  While little discussion 
on extending the actual border fence between Arizona and Sonora, the ABCI requires a 
review and implementation of new technology. 
Phase I of the ABCI initiative increases border security resources with the 
addition of 200 border patrol agents in the Tucson Sector and four air support units. 
Further, Phase I strengthens partnerships with Mexico with the establishment of an 
internal repatriation program and interior enforcement efforts.  A detailed description of 
the new programs, internal repatriation and UAVs, is provided below. 
Internal Repatriation:  The internal repatriation program with Mexico is an effort 
to decrease the flow of immigration by reducing the recidivism rate and death tolls along 
the Arizona-Sonora desert.  In addition to the internal repatriation program, the U.S. 
government returned apprehended Mexican migrants to Mexico through the nearest 
Mexican POE.  This process is known as the voluntary return, and is not considered a 
formal deportation process given that the migrant does not go before an immigration 
judge and was not formally deported.  This is a swift and voluntary process that alleviates 
the judicial system of an exorbitant volume of immigration cases.  However, the 
voluntary return process allows migrants to attempt re-entry into the U.S. within hours of 
their return to Mexico because of their proximity to the international boundary, creating a 
“revolving immigration door.”  The internal repatriation program is intended to stop this 
cycle of re-entry into the U.S. 
Under the internal repatriation program, apprehended migrants voluntarily opt to 
be returned to Mexico City or Guadalajara, Mexico.  The USBP states that this program 
facilitates the return of migrants to their families and provides an option for those 
migrants who regret traveling to the U.S.39  These migrants undergo an interview process 
with the Mexican Consulate to ensure that their rights are protected.  Then, the migrants 
are flown back to Mexico City or Guadalajara.  The USBP declared the repatriation 
program a success in their efforts to establish control of the border because the program 
                                                
39 Lou Maheda, U.S. Border Patrol Agent, Presentation on Nogales Border Patrol Station Operations 
in Nogales, AZ, June 6, 2005. 
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saved lives in the desert and interrupted the “revolving door” of apprehensions.40  
Nevertheless, interior repatriation is not a new program with Mexico; in fact, for the past 
three decades the U.S. has tried interior repatriation with minimal results.41  If the end-
goal is to stop the flow of migrants crossing the USMB, internal repatriation is not the 
answer, given the experience with previous repatriation programs.  CBP recognizes that 
the internal repatriation program “will not solve the long-term socio-economic issues that 
influence immigration policy.”42  This then begs the question, why is the U.S. 
government spending $13 million in “band aid fixes” (internal repatriation) when these 
funds could be used to increase border security resources?43 
UAVs:  The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for decades pioneered using 
drones during various operations.  Fort Huachuca, Arizona conducts different UAV tests 
and trains soldiers on how to man them.  Previous to the implementation of the ABCI, 
DOD and USBP entered into a partnership, which allows USBP to take advantage of the 
UAV testing to spot illegal cross-border activity and deploy USBP resources accordingly.  
From this partnership, USBP learned of UAVs capabilities and made the policy decision 
to conduct a UAV pilot program in the Tucson Sector.44 
In an interview with C-SPAN, DHS Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson claimed that 
while physical fences along the border add a protective level, there is a need to man the 
fence.  As a consequence, fencing alone is not the answer to stop illegal cross-border 
activity.  Hence, using new technologies such as UAVs can be much more effective than 
an actual physical barrier.45  The Congressional Research Service Report states that “the 
use of UAVs on the Northern and Southern borders could potentially act as important 
force multipliers by covering previously unpatrolled areas or more effectively surveilling 
                                                
40 Lou Maheda, (U.S. Border Patrol Agent), Presentation on Nogales Border Patrol Station Operations 
in Nogales, AZ,  June 6, 2005. 
41 Former USBP Agent in discussion with the author, Phoenix, AZ, February 23, 2006. 
42 Customs and Border Protection, “Repatriation:  No Easy Answers,”  Customs and Border 
Protection Today, July-August 2004, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/Aug/repatriation.xml 
(accessed January 28, 2006). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Colonel Matthew Walsh (Fort Huachuca, Arizona) in discussion with the author, June 2004. 
45 Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in an interview with C-
SPAN, WA Journal, February 21, 2005. 
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areas already patrolled.”46  Under the ABCI, UAVs were introduced as a pilot program to 
the Tucson Sector. With well over 1,000 apprehensions in just six months of operations, 
the pilot program was deemed a success by both the USBP and the U.S. General 
Accounting Office.47  Now, the USBP notes that UAVs serve as a security asset for 
agents by providing an advance picture of what type of scenario or incident agents may 
encounter.48  Dispatchers also are able to deploy resources efficiently based on this 
remote situation reconnaissance.  However, in a recent visit to Fort Huachuca, Arizona 
the authored learned that the USBP is no longer under-taking operations at this location.  
Understanding that the closest USBP station is one-hour away from Fort Huachuca and 
the distance to travel alone is an inefficient use of the USBP agent’s time. 
In March 2005, DHS Secretary Chertoff expanded to Phase II of the ABCI.  This 
expansion assigned an additional 500 agents to the Tucson Sector.  In an interview with 
C-SPAN, the USBP Tucson Sector Chief Patrol Agent, Michael Nicley, indicated that the 
additional 500 agents meet the requisite number of border patrol agents necessary to 
secure the border in the Tucson Sector.49  The message DHS hoped to send migrants with 
the increased security initiative is that the international boundary must be respected and 
migrants must not attempt illegal entry.  According to a U.S. State Department report 
regarding Southern Border Initiatives, USBP Chief, David Aguilar, told senators that the 
ABCI “had a significantly positive impact in the area known for illicit smuggling of 
persons and drugs.”50 
However, unlike the enforcement efforts in the San Diego and El Paso Sectors, 
the ABCI initiative has not seen a decrease in migrant apprehensions.  Rather, the Tucson  
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48 Ibid. 
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Sector continues to show an increase in apprehensions despite the increased border 
security resources.  Given this situation and the limited resources, USBP launched a 
supplementing initiative called Operation Stonegarden. 
2. Operation Stonegarden 
Operation Stonegarden was an initiative launched by former DHS Secretary Tom 
Ridge to increase state, tribal and local law enforcement participation in border security 
efforts.  Through the State Homeland Security Grant Program, DHS authorized payment 
to state, tribal and local law enforcement agencies of back-fill and over-time for assisting 
USBP to assist in border security operations.  In place from October 2004 until January 
2005, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff considered this operation a success because non-
federal law enforcement agencies became a force multiplier within the border region by 
supporting border security efforts in the Tucson Sector.51  This operation helped close the 
gap in the number of requisite enforcement agents by increasing the personnel on the 
ground.  Many of these agents patrolled the highways, urban areas and illegal cross-
border activity corridors.  The over-time and back-fill of law enforcement officers is a 
financial burden on local communities.  Non-federal law enforcement agencies are 
willing to assist USBP but can only continue support patrol activities as long as funding 
resources are provided.52 
The measures of impact and effectiveness used by the USBP in the San Diego and 
El Paso Sectors are a decrease in local apprehensions and a displacement of migrants to 
another area along the border.  ABCI and Operation Stonegarden are two initiatives 
designed to establish and maintain border control.  Despite these steps, however, the 
Tucson Sector continues to be the main gateway for illegal cross-border activity along the 
Southwest border.  Why then is USBP claiming a success in the Tucson Sector?  If the 
parameters used to determine success in San Diego and El Paso are accurate, then the 
USBP has seemingly failed in its control efforts in the Tucson Sector.  However, after the 
first six months of the ABCI implementation, former DHS Undersecretary Asa 
Hutchinson stated, “"[Border and Transportation Security] initiatives are impairing the 
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ability of smuggling organizations to operate, saving many lives and restoring control to 
the Arizona border."53  Border control has not been achieved along the Arizona border; 
therefore, USBP should not claim a success in the Tucson Sector. 
 
F. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION 
Despite the best strategic efforts of the USBP, not all people, goods, and services 
enter the U.S. legally through a designated POE.  Illegal border crossers continue to enter 
the U.S. in between POEs, exposing the weak areas of our current border security system.  
As such, from a socio-political standpoint, there is a dire need to create a border security 
system to prevent such activity from occurring.  Although the USBP philosophy of 
‘prevention through deterrence’ seems appropriate in theory, in effect it has proven to be 
of limited success.  Thus, it is helpful to examine the challenges confronting the USBP, 
and the Tucson Sector in particular, by providing the situational awareness of the various 
humanitarian and social concerns that occur in the Sonora region. 
1. Non-US Governmental Actors; Faith-based Community Efforts 
Many non-profit and faith-based organizations are attempting to address a myriad 
of humanitarian concerns in the border region by providing shelter, water, clothing, 
medical services and meals.  In order to understand this dimension of border security 
efforts and the real hardships migrants face as they continue their journey, the author 
made a visit to the City of Altar, Sonora, a known staging area for illegal entry to the U.S. 
and where the Catholic Dioceses provides humanitarian relief to migrants.  The following 
section describes an interview conducted with Father Rene Castañeda of Sonora.54 
Father Castañeda is a young and energetic Diocesan priest assigned by his 
Archbishop to oversee the plight of migrants in Altar, Sonora.  When he arrived at the 
Altar Dioceses in 2001, he found his paisanos (fellow countrymen) loitering at the 
Municipal Plaza around the local church as they rested while waiting for their “coyote” 
(human smuggler) to guide them to the international border.  In Altar, he found these 
                                                
53 Asa Hutchinson, U.S. DHS, Border and Transportation Security Undersecretary, “At Six Months, 
Arizona Border Control Initiative Marks Successes:  DHS To Extend Multi-Agency Program Into Fall,” 
Inside ICE I, Issue 12, September 27, 2004, 
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/insideice/articles/insideice_092704_Web6.htm  (accessed December 6, 
2004). 
54 Father Rene Castañeda (diocesan priest, Altar, Sonora), in discussion with the author, June 2004. 
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migrants grossly mistreated. Migrants were sleeping outside walls of the church and 
mothers with their children suffered assaults from other migrants and bandits.  In 
addition, the local Altar residents discriminated against the migrants, calling them 
“Oaxacas,” a demeaning name for people from the south of Mexico.  Father Castañeda 
began his charitable efforts by providing food every Sunday to groups of 200 migrants 
gathered at the church.  Father Castañeda has now dedicated his life to providing 
assistance for these less fortunate people. 
Father Castañeda confronts many obstacles in the local Altar community.  With a 
population of 9,000, the town of Altar suffers from a lack of water due to the high influx 
of daily migrants, between 3,000 and 4,000 each day.  Additionally, Father Castañeda 
faces opposition from the local community who believe that the Archbishop sent him 
only to help the “lowly Oaxacas.”  Meanwhile, an increase in the migrants’ demand for 
services, such as guesthouses and kiosks with backpacks, food, and water, has changed 
the local economy, which historically relied mainly on agriculture and cattle. These 
changes have lead to the sustained growth of illegal human trafficking. 
The community also encounters serious problems with the Coyotes and their 
opportunist scams.  For example, as the migrants call their family from a local telephone 
booth, a Coyote will stand nearby, jot down the phone number, and request funds from 
the migrant’s family.  The migrant’s family, believing that their relatives are already in 
the U.S., will then wire the funds to a local Western Union or similar courier services in 
Altar where the Coyote subsequently steals the funds.  Another pervasive problem in 
Altar is a crime known as “La Trata.”  Deceived into thinking that they are being 
recruited to work in the U.S. as fashion models, women and young girls are signed away 
by their families and forced into prostitution when they enter the U.S. 
In order to keep migrants safe from these despicable conditions, Father Castañeda 
has developed a sanctuary that provides migrants with food, sleep quarters, clothing, 
medicine, spiritual guidance and other basic necessities. With the assistance of those few 
in the Altar community that support his efforts, Father Castañeda has built a center called 
Community Service Center for the Migrant and Needy (CCAMYN - Centro Comunitario 
de Atención al Migrante y Necesitado), an amicable place that does not reject or 
discriminate. Once there, he requires that migrants take a shower prior to going to bed 
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and provides them with clothing if necessary. Since the migrants who go to the Center 
tend to be extremely poor, this is often their first lifetime exposure to a shower and 
bathroom facilities. Also, the Center functions to raise the awareness level about human 
rights through scripture readings, not only for the migrants, but also for the community at 
large. Although the average daily occupancy is about 20, the Center has the capacity to 
hold up to 30 people. The allowable period of stay is three days, with a provision for 
extending the time up to 15 days. 
Since the Center opened in 2001, it has helped over 14,285 migrants. When a 
migrant seeks assistance they must go through an interview process and receive a lecture 
on the value of hard work.  Consequently, 50% of the Center’s fees are paid by the 
Mexican Grupo Beta and the other 50% is charged to the migrant.  To pay the fee, each 
migrant must leave the Center at 7 AM everyday to seek employment in the nearby 
fields.  In order for migrants to stay at the Center, they must demonstrate that they have 
found work within that three-day period.  The Center investigates to ensure they are 
working and if they are respectful they will be granted an extension.  Yet the conditions 
are so dire that even after the education sessions, 80% of people who arrive at the Center 
travel north to cross the border, 20% return as deportees, of which 5% return to their 
place of origin.  Since migrants from the south of Mexico continuously receive subsidy 
grants from the Mexican government, Father Castañeda is well aware of their tendency 
toward dependence and a resulting sense of laziness.  His center does not tolerate that 
behavior and if it persists the migrant will be asked to leave. 
2. Migrants Head North 
In 1999, Mexican Grupo Beta claimed an average of 300 migrants a day travel 
through Altar.  Today, an average of 1,500 migrants a day travel through the Tortuguita 
checkpoint,55 many of them children with an average age of between 16 and 18 years 
old.56  Mexican Grupo Beta indicated that there are several staging areas that provide 
access to the international border, but Altar is known as the primary access point for 
Central Americans and Mexicans.  Other staging areas along the ASB include: Nogales, 
                                                
55 The Mexican Grupo Beta mans the Tortugita checkpoint, which is located between Altar and 
Sasabe, a place where Grupo Beta speaks to the migrants about the dangers of crossing the border illegally.  
Additionally at the checkpoint, Mexican Grupo Beta counts the number of migrants passing through. 
56 Mexican Grupo Beta Official, Tortuguita check-point in Sonora, Mexico, in discussion with the 
author, June 6, 2005. 
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Naco and Agua Prieta, as will be explained in greater detail in Chapter IV.  These staging 
areas define the decision points for migrants to cross the international border.  
Interestingly, Coyotes have color-coded the illegal routes and gather the migrants 
according to the colored route for their travel north to the U.S. 
Altar is about 90 kilometers south of the border.  Migrants are transported by van 
to “La Ladrillera” (a brick yard) about 10 kilometers south of Sasabe, a border town.  On 
the way to La Ladrillera, the Mexican Grupo Beta provides and offers assistance to 
migrants at a checkpoint about an hour away from Altar, called “La Tortugita” (The 
Little Turtle).  At this checkpoint, Mexican Grupo Beta keeps track of the number of 
migrants traveling north, provides a natural hazard awareness session and offers 
assistance to the migrants. 
This is the final staging point until migrants are gathered and transported through 
the desert along a cattle trucks route that parallels the international border.  The final 
destinations are either the San Miguel gate (POE on the Tohono O’odham Nation), or 
Pozos Verdes, two locations adjacent to the international fence.  From the Ladrillera to 
either final destination point the terrain is rugged and needs heavy-duty vehicles such as 
cattle trucks to provide access.  The migrants are loaded on to cattle trucks.  This change 
in vehicles occurs because the vans have a transportion-operating permit between Altar 
and Sasabe and if they detour from the permitted route, they risk losing the operating 
permit.  It costs migrants 100 pesos ($10 USD) to be transported from Altar to Ladrillera 
and an additional 60 pesos ($6 USD) from the La Ladrillera to San Miguel gate. 
During their stay in Altar, Father Castañeda tries to educate the migrants about the 
potential dangers faced when crossing the border and putting their lives into the hands of 
the Coyote.  He educates migrants about the dangers of the desert by providing awareness 
of possible death due to extreme weather and terrain conditions.  Additionally, Father 
Castañeda informs migrants about how Coyotes provide migrants with an illegal drug 
called “speed” to decrease a migrants resting time.  Many migrants are not aware that the 
drug provided by their smuggler is illegal and can potentially kill them because of a lack  
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of nutrition and overdose.  Many migrants cannot afford a Coyote and opt to walk the 
Altar desert in their efforts to travel north, which causes many to die in Sonora or in close 
proximity of the international border, as highlighted in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   2004 Migrant Deaths, Water Stations, and Rescue Beacons 
 
(From: Humane Borders, “2004 Migrant Deaths, Water Stations, and Rescue Beacons,” 
http://www.humaneborders.org [accessed June 2005]). 
 
Father Castañeda realizes that providing these services for up to 30 migrants a day 
is insufficient to truly combat the problem of migration.  Yet, his services are the bare 
necessities essential in providing assistance to those who need it most.  Father Castañeda 
continues to promote human dignity for the migrants, the settlers, and those left to die on 
their travels.  He knows that every migrant comes primarily to look for work, something  
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to eat, and a place to protect their family.  He strongly believes that illegal immigration 
will not end until the root causes are dealt with collectively, specifically the economic 
reasons that cause migrants to head north. 
The interdependencies along the border supplemented with the socio-economic 
issues requires a border security system that not only enforces the U.S. immigration law, 
but also focuses on the humanitarian aspects and the need to increase economic 
prosperity especially in high-sending regions.  Additionally, border security systems need 
to be flexible to adapt to new emerging threats, the next chapter will focus on the 
increasing threats along the international border and illegal smugglers’ counter-reactions 
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III. BORDER SECURITY OR INSECURITY? 
A. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING BORDER SECURITY RESOURCES 
TO THE USMB 
Two main factors contribute to the ever-increasing demands placed upon border 
security resources along the USMB.  First, the pressure of enhanced law enforcement 
strategies in certain sectors has resulted in a shift of migrants from more secure urban 
areas to those rural communities that are less protected and populated.57  For example, as 
crime rates dropped in San Diego and El Paso due to more concentrated border security 
efforts, the Tucson Sector experienced an increase in illegal activity supplemented by 
violent crimes of auto-theft, extortion, rape, and homicide.  Moreover, on a statewide 
basis, both Arizona and Sonora are currently facing higher crime rates.  Arizona ranks 
first in auto-theft and third in homicide in the U.S., while Sonora ranks third in homicide 
in Mexico. 58 
Second, Mexico is experiencing an influx of the Islamic migrants with over 120 
undocumented Middle Easterners currently residing in Mexico.59 Conceivably, as the 
U.S. government increases security measures and tightens immigration law, potential 
terrorists may seek the assistance of human smugglers to infiltrate the porous 
international border.  If this theory holds true, then the policymakers should ask the same 
question that Arizona Senator Kyl posed on August 27, 2004, “Why wouldn’t those 
seeking to attack America be tempted to join the hundreds of thousands already illegally 
entering from Mexico?”60  In fact, intelligence collected from domestic and international 
                                                
57 This is one theory in regards to the displacement of migrants along the USMB.  An alternative 
theory is the economic growth rates experienced in Phoenix and Las Vegas.  These two cities are 
experiencing a fast growth rate followed by an increase in construction and employment.  This boom in 
jobs in Nevada and Arizona causes the illegal migrant flow to switch to follow the employment 
opportunities. 
58 Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, “Arizona Crime Trends:  A System Review,” Statistical 
Analysis Center Publication, July 22, 2005, http://azcjc.gov/pubs/home/Crime_Trends_2005.pdf (accessed 
August 3, 2005). Consejo de Seguridad Publica, “Programa de Mediano Plazo 2004 - 2009: Seguridad 
Publica,” http://www.sonora.gob.mx/biblioteca/documentos/pmp/seguridad.pdf (accessed August 3, 2005) 
59 Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Política de Acción Comunitaria, “Guerra Mundial: 
Consecuencias Para México,” November 21, 2001, http://www.ciepac.org/bulletins/200-300/bolec267.htm  
(accessed December 6, 2004). 
60 Senator Jon Kyl, “Arizona: a ‘Terrorist Corridor?’,” The Arizona Conservative, Guest Opinion, 
August 27, 2004, http://www.azconservative.org/Kyl_TerrorismCorridor.htm (accessed December 6, 
2004). 
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law enforcement communities indicates that terrorists are seeking other means to enter 
the U.S.61  As terrorist organizations continue to network in Mexico and exploit the 
sophisticated organized smuggling rings, the USBP could seemingly be faced with a new 
paradigm: Coyotes as potential terrorists. 
 
B. THE BALLOON EFFECT:  COMMUNITY POLICING APPLICABILITY 
TO BORDER SECURITY EFFORTS 
As noted in Chapter II, in the early 1990s, the USBP launched a concentrated 
border security strategy in the El Paso and San Diego Sectors causing migrants and 
smugglers to move their operations to less secure sectors along the USMB.  The U.S. 
General Accounting Office Reports suggests that these strategies showed positive results 
for both sectors.  However, the remaining seven sectors along the Southwest border saw 
an increase in illegal cross-border activity, particularly the Tucson Sector.  In 1993, the 
San Diego Sector represented 43.6% of the Southwest border apprehensions, and the El 
Paso Sector represented 23.6%.62  Yet, as the USBP claimed victory in the San Diego 
and El Paso Sectors with a reduction in apprehensions by 6% and 72%, respectively, the 
Tucson Sector experienced an increase by 50%.63  This increase is a clear indication of 
the balloon effect along the USMB – the displacement of illegal cross-border activity to 
another less secure sector of the international border.  This phenomenon was a 
consequence by the National Strategic Plan demonstrating that the border control efforts 
in the San Diego and El Paso Sectors were working.  However, the migrant flow shift 
was not intended to stop in the USBP Tucson Sector instead to continuously shift 
migrants from one sector to another causing disruption of organized smuggling rings; this 
theory derives from hot spots and community-oriented policing. 
Place-oriented crime prevention strategies, also known as community policing, 
are commonly used by law enforcement agencies throughout the U.S.  The theory behind  
                                                
61 Admiral James Loy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary, testimony before the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005. 
62 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Border Control:  Revised Strategy is Showing Positive Results,”  
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture, Committee 
on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington D.C., December 1994: 11. 
63 Ibid. 
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place-oriented crime prevention suggests that crime occurs in clusters, or “hot spots,” and 
is not evenly distributed throughout the U.S.  As defined by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs: 
A hot spot is an area that has a greater than average number of criminal or 
disorder events, or an area where people have a higher than average risk of 
victimization.  This suggests the existence of cool spots – places or areas 
with less than average amount of crime or disorder.64 
This is a phenomenon is used by individuals everyday, evidenced by the places 
people tending to avoid or frequent given their probability of victimization.  This 
suggests that crime is not evenly distributed.  One can deduce that the National Strategic 
Plan draws from this theory; this is evident because resources were focused in the urban 
areas.  The USBP continues to implement strategies that are complementary to 
community policing.   Experts suggest that this “hot spots” phenomenon is supported by 
three complementary theories: environmental criminology, routine activities and rational 
choice.  Environmental criminology theory explores and analyzes the environment in 
which a criminal act is conducted.  The analysis takes into consideration the criminal 
interaction with targets, the opportunities across space and time, and the characteristics of 
the area, such as safe havens.  Routine activities theory is based on the notion that in the 
absence of a capable guardian, crime occurs when the bandit comes into the close 
proximity of a potential target. Rational choice is based on the belief that the bandits are 
capable of making their own decisions and opts to commit a crime in order to benefit. 
Another interesting analysis that is drawn from community-policing is that as law 
enforcement pressure is applied in a “hot spot,” crimes begin to emerge in “cool spots.”  
Experts claim as “focused police interventions, such as directed patrols, proactive arrests, 
and problem solving, can produce significant crime prevention gains at high-crime “hot 
spots.”65  In a nutshell, “hot spot” policing suggests that if the environment is 
manipulated (i.e., patrols, arrests, etc.), then victims and offenders have fewer 
interactions and bandits have fewer opportunities to commit crimes, which ultimately 
results in a decrease in the crime rate.  In addition, once a “hot spot” is controlled and 
                                                
64 Office of Justice Programs, “Mapping Crime:  Understanding Hot Spots” (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice, August 2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij (accessed January 10, 2006). 
65 Ibid. 
34 
crime has decreased, bandits will move to a less patrolled area to continue their criminal 
activities.  The described criminal migrations are occurring at the Southwest border.  
Apprehension statistics are a clear indication that IBC have migrated to areas less 
patrolled by USBP, such as the Tucson Sector. 
The USBP has focused their resources in the urban areas along the international 
border for a variety of reasons, such as, preventing bandits from interacting with border 
community residents and restricting bandits from access to safe havens or camouflaging 
into the community.  In addition, the balloon effect experienced in the Tucson Sector 
parallels the concept of “hot spots” in urban areas.  Once the community policing 
addresses a “hot spot” crime area, the crime moves into a less policed area.  Similarly, 
when the USBP focuses enforcement efforts along the USMB, migrants and bandits 
move into less secured sectors.  This shift was the intention of the USBP’s concentrated 
border security strategy.  Therefore, USBP was not surprised to see bandits and 
smugglers moving towards the Tucson Sector. 
Then, why isn’t the USBP Tucson Sector prepared to handle the influx of 
migrants?  The answer could be a combination of issues, be they politics, resources or the 
simple notion that the geographical constraints would be a sufficient deterrent for 
migrants entering the U.S.  The U.S. government must continue to develop and timely 
implement border security strategies that take into consideration the movement of illegal 
activities along the border in order to successfully secure the USMB, as described in 
Chapter II.  However, the post-9/11 need to protect the U.S. from another terrorist attack 
requires intelligence analysts to observe for potential emerging terrorists threats along the 
international border. 
Illegal smuggling is a growing national security concern.  The similar 
characteristics and operational structures between illegal smugglers and terrorists cannot 
be taken lightly.  Although there is no intelligence indicating that these networks are 
supporting terrorism, al-Qaeda continues to seek new ways to penetrate the U.S.  As 
organized smuggling rings begin to financially support terrorist organizations, or 
facilitate terrorists’ illegal entry, then one can argue that illegal smuggling constitutes a 
new form of terrorism.  Given the above criteria, then DHS must recognize this new form 
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of terrorism as “smuggler-terrorism.”  If the U.S. overlooks this potential threat and is ill-
prepared to swiftly modify border security efforts, then the nation will face a greater 
homeland security challenge. The next chapter will focus specifically on the USBP 
Tucson Sector implementation of the border security strategies and initiatives at the 
operational level.  This will provide a comprehensive review of the operational tactics 
employed to respond to illegal cross-border activity, the socio-economic issues, and the 
balloon effect.  The described operational structure is implemented into the ASB model 
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IV. USBP TUCSON SECTOR OPERATIONS 
A. USBP TUCSON SECTOR’S TACTICAL RESPONSE TO THE BALLOON 
EFFECT 
The USBP Tucson Sector spans all of Arizona, excluding the area of Yuma, with 
262 linear miles and 90,953 square miles.66  The extreme weather conditions and the 
desolate, vast and rugged terrain combined with a lack of border infrastructure make it 
extremely difficult for the USBP to attain border security.  According to the USBP Chief 
Nicely of the Tucson Sector, there is a dire need to increase technology and resources in 
order to establish control of the area.67  In an effort to establish and maintain control of 
the ASB, the Tucson Sector has eight border patrol stations.  These stations are located 
primarily in three smuggling corridors:  the West Corridor (Ajo, Casa Grande, and 
Sonora), the Nogales Corridor (Tucson and Nogales), and the Naco-Douglas Corridor 
(Naco, Douglas, and Wilcox).  Each of these corridors represents geographical areas that 
serve as gateways for specific, well-known smuggling routes and staging areas in Sonora, 
Mexico.68  Another challenge that contributes to the USBP border enforcement is the 
various private, state, tribal and federal land ownership.  This varying land ownership 
creates questionable jurisdictional authority in the Tucson Sector.69  Jurisdictional 
questions require the USBP to creatively collaborate with a variety of entities in order to 
gain access and execute agreements regarding the patrol operational tactics in the Tucson 
Sector.  These processes can be complex and time-consuming.  As the USBP cooperates 
with other stakeholders, migrants are heading north. 
Unauthorized migrants currently stage in six primary locations along the Sonora 
border.  These identified staging areas are where migrants rendezvous with their 
smuggler, also known as “Coyote,” prior to being guided north through the USBP Tucson 
Sector.  Figure 2 identifies the known illegal smuggling routes that lead into each 
                                                
66 These numbers do not add up because the Tucson Sector geographical area is not a perfect 
geometrical shape. 
67 Chris Strohm, “Arizona Border Patrol Chief Cites Need for More Resources, Personnel,”  
GOVEXEC.COM,  April 25, 2005. 
68 Father Rene Castañeda, in discussion with the author, June 2004. 
69 Lisa Seghetti and others, “Border Security and the Southwest Border: Background, Legislation, and 
Issues,” Congressional Research Service (September 28, 2005): 24. 
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corridor of this Sector.  The staging area furthest from the international border is in Santa 
Ana, Sonora.  From here, the migrants determine which route they will eventually use to 
cross the U.S. border. The decision of which gateway to use is based upon information 
provided by “scouts.”70  Migrants are generally directed through the towns of Altar, 
Nogales, Cananea, Naco, or Agua Prieta, in the State of Sonora. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Tucson Sector and Sonora Illegal Smuggling Routes 
 
• Altar, Sonora serves as a decision point to enter the U.S. through Pozos 
Verde, Sonora or the San Miguel Gate. These routes are within the West 
Corridor (Green). 
• Rancho Las Tinajas leads migrants to Sasabe or Nogales. These routes are 
within the Nogales Corridor (Blue). 
• Rancho Tres Bellotas lead migrants through Arivaca, Arizona, also within 
the Nogales Corridor (Blue). 
                                                
70 Scouts work for the Coyote and are located at observation posts in the border region to provide 
warnings to the Coyote. 
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• Cananea directs migrants to Naco or Agua Prieta, Sonora through the 
Naco-Douglas Corridor.  This route is known for a high concentration of 
OTM migrants, primarily from Central and South America.71 
1. USBP Tucson Sector Tactical Operations 
The USBP Tucson Sector is divided into a grid system with each border patrol 
station responsible for a determined number of grids.  Each grid represents approximately 
seven square miles.  However, if the area encompasses a high-population hub, then this 
grid may be broken down into smaller areas (i.e., 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D).  This division 
serves many purposes such as assigning and identifying the location of agents and 
resources, as well as for data collection.  For example, when an unauthorized migrant is 
apprehended the border patrol agent asks the migrant to identify his/her point of entry.  
The border patrol agent then records the approximate point of entry and where the 
migrant was apprehended. This information is provided to the intelligence unit for 
tracking illegal migrant routes and patterns.  However, many times the migrant does not 
provide accurate information because the migrant is not from the area.  As stated earlier, 
migrants are distributed to each color-coded route accordingly.  If the USBP learns what 
color each route is and then requests that the migrant indicate the color of their route, this 
information may provide a more accurate picture to the intelligence unit. 
While the number of agents varies depending on each station and the extension of 
the pre-determined area of responsibility, on average there are four shifts per station in a 
24-hour period (e.g., Midnight – 8 AM, 6 AM – 2 PM, 2 PM – 10 PM, and 6 PM – 2 
AM).  Every agent receives a daily schedule (G-481). This schedule identifies the 
location and equipment assignments made to each agent with each unit by the Shift 
Supervisor.  Before the beginning of each shift, the Shift Supervisor conducts a briefing 
(also known as muster), which runs for about 15-30 minutes and gives supervisors and 
agents the opportunity to address officer safety issues, receive intelligence updates, 
border patrol policies and procedures, and ask questions on directives. 
2. Nogales Border Patrol Station 
Nogales, Arizona is the largest border community along the Arizona-Sonora 
border and represents the economic focal point, which leads into the CANAMEX 
                                                
71 Mexican Grupo Beta Official, Tortuguita check-point in Sonora, Mexico, in discussion with the 
author, June 6, 2005. 
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Corridor.72 During the 1990s, downtown Nogales, Arizona suffered from a lack of border 
control so Operation Safeguard was created.  As part of Operation Safeguard, the USBP 
has concentrated resources in this area since 1998.  To understand Operation Safeguard, 
it is important to comprehend the USBP station operations, the advancements made by 
Nogales, and Nogales’ significance along the Arizona-Sonora boundary. 
The Nogales Border Patrol Station is only one of eight border patrol stations 
within the Tucson Sector.  It currently houses fewer than 200 agents, yet their duties are 
immense.  For example, in 2004, the Nogales Border Patrol Station apprehended 77,560 
Mexican nationals and 1,396 OTMs, seized 101,700 lbs. of marijuana (a street value of 
$81,424,000.00), 879 lbs of cocaine (a street value of $28,611,399.00),73 seized 1034 
vehicles, and recuperated 41 stolen vehicles.74  The USBP holds dual authority to arrest 
administratively or criminally. Therefore, the USBP can prosecute any person involved in 
human smuggling. The goal in granting this authority to the USBP aims at decreasing 
death in the desert and reducing the overall Arizona crime rate.  In fact, since 1999, the 
crime rate in Santa Cruz County has decreased by 49% as a direct result of the USBPs 
concentrated enforcement in the urban area.  Therefore, the USBP’s border security 
strategy demonstrates positive results when implemented.  The strategy is clearly strong 
in the urban areas, but less strong in the rural areas, the vast majority of the USMB, 
leaving it under secured. 
The Nogales Border Patrol Station oversees 32 miles of international border 
(1100 square meters).  This station encompasses the largest border community in Arizona 
with Nogales’ population at over 40,000.  This community experiences strenuous weather 
conditions: in the summer highs exceed 110 degrees and in the winter low reach 10 
degrees.  The Nogales Border Patrol’s operations are essentially divided into three layers 
of enforcement, a model used by DOD but adjusted to the USMB given its peaceful non-
militant nature.  Each layer is concentric and three-dimensional, including underground 
(sewers and tunnels), ground and air operations.  This operational set-up demonstrates the                                                 
72 CANAMEX Corridor is a Congressionally defined economic corridor that encompasses Canada, 
U.S. and Mexico.  In the U.S. there are five states that are part of the CANAMEX Corridor:  Montana, 
Idaho, Nevada, California and Arizona. 
73 The street value of cocaine is significantly higher than for marijuana; note the difference in price. 
74 Lou Maheda, U.S. Border Patrol Agent, Presentation on Nogales Border Patrol Station Operations 
in Nogales, AZ,  June 6, 2005. 
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efforts of USBP to deploy resources to the “hot spots” along the border, while gaining 
control along the outskirts of each concentrated area.  Tactics used by both law 
enforcement and DOD.  Figure 4 represents the Nogales Border Patrol Station’s layers of 
enforcement: 
 
Figure 4.   Systematic Representation of the Nogales Border Patrol Layers of Enforcement 
 
Note: This diagram is not drawn to scale; it is simply a visual to understand the 
functionality of the layers of enforcement. 
 
The first layer (L1) is within the urban area of the City of Nogales. This layer 
focuses on improving the quality of life and safety, decreasing crime, and enhancing 
community relations.  The USBP seeks to accomplish deterrence with a large presence of 
border patrol.  The USBP considers the urban area as a potential safe-haven for illegal 
entrants because the unauthorized migrant blends within the population; accompanied by 
criminal activity and public health concerns augmenting the challenges faced by USBP to 
enforce U.S. immigration law.  In this first layer of defense, the USBP has localized the 
patrol areas, increased technology and infrastructure improvements (fencing75, cameras, 
and sky watch towers76), and employed high profile response units.  Each High Profile 
                                                
75 There are 4.2 miles of fencing to the east of DeConcini POE and there are two miles of fencing to 
the west of Mariposa.  In between DeConicini and Mariposa there is fencing. One of the biggest challenges 
is maintenance; fences are compromised on a daily basis. 
76 Sky Watch Towers are equipped with both day and night vision cameras that are operated by one 
US Border Patrol agent, who can through the dispatch center deploy US Border Patrol agents to the 
incident. 
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Response Unit includes eight vehicles – each one manned and deployed along the fence 
as a deterrence mechanism.  The vehicles have protection around windows to ensure the 
safety of the agent, who is routinely subjected to rock throwing and shooting. In 2004, 
there were 24 rock assaults, which resulted in over $70,000 in damage.77 
In addition, bike units are deployed in both the city and canyon areas.  This unit 
works in packs of six crews per shift.  There are two bike shifts:  7-3 PM and 3-11 PM.  
Additionally, some camera poles along the Nogales downtown area have big spotlights to 
serve as deterrence and imply that the USBP is “watching.”  This first layer also includes 
the sewers and tunnels because the majority of tunnels serve as a focal point of illegal 
operations.78  Smugglers continue to use tunnels to transfer drugs and humans across the 
border.79  The average length of a tunnel ranges from 40 feet up to 320 feet.  Some 
tunnels are drivable and are connected to the public sewer infrastructure of Sonora.  The 
USBP continues to use intrusion devises, remotely operated by a public service 
announcement system, lights, sirens, and three to five agents per shift to patrol the sewers 
and tunnels.  However, these defense mechanisms can only be used once a tunnel has 
been detected.  This is another challenge that the USBP continues to face. 
The second layer (L2) is area immediately surrounding the urban area of Nogales. 
This suburb area functions as a first line of defense for the area to the east, west and north 
of L1.  If deterrence works in the first layer, human smugglers will seek alternative routes 
in the suburbs to cross the international border, known as the balloon effect.  In this layer 
of defense, which also includes air operations, border patrol uses sensors, cameras, 
stadium-like lighting, trucks with scopes and sky watchtowers.80  In addition, there are 40 
helicopters, which are employed 24 hours a day and include at least one Border Patrol  
                                                
77 Lou Maheda, U.S. Border Patrol Agent, Presentation on Nogales Border Patrol Station Operations 
in Nogales, AZ,  June 6, 2005. 
78 Old technology helps control the tunnels – old police radio, camera, TV screen. 
79 Anthony P. Placido, Drug Enforcement Administration, Acting Assistant Administrator for 
Intelligence, testimony before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human 
Resources, “Threat Convergence Along the Border:  How Does Drug Trafficking Impact our Borders?” 
June 14, 2005, http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct061205.html (accessed December 25, 2005). 
80 Sky watch towers:  hydraulic boxes into the air for about 18 feet, equipped with day/night cameras.  
An agent stands around, monitoring the cameras; he can switch over from the control center.  If he needs to 
he comes down and jumps into his vehicle to apprehend illegal immigrants. 
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Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) Team agent.  BORSTAR is a search, trauma 
and rescue unit that was implemented to save lives in the rugged terrain and extreme 
weather conditions of the desert. 
Using Operation Gatekeeper’s measures for progress as a benchmark of 
operational control, then the USBP should expect a decrease in apprehension to occur in 
L1 with an increase of apprehension in L2 just as it did in the San Diego and El Paso 
Sectors.  Essentially, this indicates that USBP has established and maintained control in 
L1 and is shifting illegal border activity away from the urban area, also known as a “hot 
spot.”  As described in Chapter III, the “hot spot” is where there is a high concentration 
of social problems. 
The third layer (L3) is the immediate area surrounding L2, which is the most 
rugged and rural area.  L3 encompasses a first line of defense for the area to the east, west 
and north of L2.  Border patrol does not clearly define the northern, interior parameter of 
L3.  The USBP goal in the third layer of enforcement is to disrupt organized human and 
drug smuggling operations by using undercover units (10 -11 agents) and by staging the 
Interstate-19 (I-19) checkpoint.81  Essentially, these undercover units use intelligence 
gathering to prevent illegal cross-border activity by going into stash houses, where they 
seek informants and restrict egress routes.  The I-19 checkpoint is a tactical operation to 
deter illegal migrants from heading further north into the U.S.  In addition, the checkpoint 
is mobile to increase the element of surprise and the deterrence element against illegal 
migrants.  Moreover, Congress requires the USBP to rigorously patrol every 14 days 
between two spots along the I-19.  However, smugglers know about the operation, which 
decreases the element of surprise and deterrence. 
In addition, L3 extends into the Mariposa Canyons of Santa Cruz County.82  This 
area represents extremely rugged terrain, making it difficult for the USBP to access many 
areas of the canyon.  However, an additional area of concern is faced by law enforcement 
on both the Mexican and U.S. sides of the border in L3 – extensive evidence of the sexual 
                                                
81 The third layer employs 6% of the personnel and 19% of all the arrests occur in this layer. 
82 Lou Maheda, U.S. Border Patrol Agent, Presentation on Nogales Border Patrol Station Operations 
in Nogales, AZ,  June 6, 2005. 
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assault and rape of migrant women and children by human smugglers.83  The USBP 
witnesses this violence during the apprehension of migrants and their need of medical 
services.  Meanwhile to the East of the Nogales POE, the Patagonia Canyons are 
considered a drug smuggling route.84  Therefore, drug interdictions are usual in L3. 
However, the USBP has recently seen an increase of unauthorized aliens’ apprehensions 
in this area as well. 
As described, the USBP Tucson Sector operational structure are three concentric 
layers of defense, however, depending on where the migrant enters along the border it 
does not mean that they will go through all layers of defense.  The next chapter will 
identify 13 most frequent illegal human and drug smuggling routes in the Tucson Sector 
and explain this situation in greater detail.  Furthermore, the operational structure in 
conjunction with the identified routes will be implemented into the ASB model to 
provide a predictive picture for policy makers and operational planners of how border 
security resources can be used more efficiently. 
                                                
83 Mexican Grupo Beta, Nogales U.S. Consulate, Tour of the Mariposa Canyon, June 2004. 
84 Mexican Grupo Beta, Nogales U.S. Consulate, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement tour of 
the drug smuggling route, September 2004. 
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V. ARIZONA – SONORA BORDER MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The USBP is set up in distinctive areas of operation, each with designated 
resources.  As discussed above, the operations function in a three-tiered concentric 
system of defense.  The San Diego Sector’s Operation Gatekeeper and the El Paso 
Sector’s Operation Hold the Line had a significant impact in countering illegal cross-
border activity.  Given the success of USBP in both San Diego and El Paso Sectors, one 
can conclude that the USBP defense alignment in these sectors is the appropriate 
operational structure to establish and maintain border control.  The ASB model draws 
from this conclusion and attempts to provide insight to the USBP efforts in the Tucson 
Sector to illegal cross-border activity. 
1. Arizona-Sonora Border Model Theory 
The ASB model explains illegal cross-border activity situations in the USBP 
Tucson Sector, or any part of it, and forecasts the effectiveness of USBP border security 
resources deployment.  For purposes of this model, the USBP Tucson Sector is defined as 
the USBP border security zone, also known as the “border zone” area of operation.  This 
model focuses on the problem of unauthorized migrants within the border zone, once the 
USBP deterrence strategy has failed and migrants are in the U.S.  Although this model is 
specific to the USBP Tucson Sector, it can be implemented anywhere along the 
Southwest Border with minor modifications.  Similar to Schilling’s Border Control 
Model, the ASB model, situation can be viewed as a depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.   Systematic Representation of the AZ-Sonora Border Model 
 
(After: Schilling, G.F.  “Analytic Model of Border Control” [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
December 1970]). 
 
As previously described, the USBP Tucson Sector is divided into three corridors 
or gateways through which migrants and smugglers illegally cross U.S. borders:  the 
West Corridor, Nogales Corridor and the Naco-Douglas Corridor.  After several border 
tours and interviews with border security experts, the following most frequented 13 
routes (j) were identified, as shown in Figure 6: 
• West Corridor:  Organ Pipe National Park, Tohono O’odham Nation – San 
Miguel Port of Entry and the Tohono O’odham Nation – Pozos Verde. 
• Nogales Corridor:  Coronado National Forest, Mariposa Canyon, the 
Nogales POEs and Patagonia. 
• Naco-Douglas Corridor: Fort Huachuca Mountains or Copper Canyon, the 
Naco POE, San Pedro Valley, Whitewater Wash area, the Douglas POE 




Figure 6.   Identified Most Frequent Illegal Human and Drug Smuggling Routes 
 
Generally, on the ground, drug smugglers and human smugglers do not use the 
same trails to cross into the U.S.  Instead, each organized crime respects each other’s 
independent area of operation.  However, given the geography, there are instances where 
overlap occurs, primarily for two reasons:  (1) drug smugglers and human smugglers are 
part of the same organization and use the migrants to help transport contraband into the 
U.S.  (2) human smugglers work in cooperation with drug smugglers to get contraband 
across the border, while distracting the USBP with the task of apprehending illegal 
immigrants.85  Whether the route is for drug or human smugglers, it falls within one of 
the USBP layers of defense, as shown in Table 2. 
 
 Routes (from E to W along border) Routes 
  Drug Migrant 
West Corridor (L3)     
Organ Pipe National Park X X 
TO Nation – San Miguel X X 
TO Nation - Pozos Verde   X 
      
                                                
85 Ramses Castro Delgado, Commander, Nogales Police Department, Sonora, in discussion with the 
author, March 2004. 
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Nogales Corridor     
Coronado National Forest (Arivaca) (L3) X X 
Mariposa Canyon (L2)   X 
Nogales POE (L1) X X 
Patagonia (L2) X   
      
Naco-Douglas Corridor     
Ft. Huachuca Mountains (Copper Canyon) (L3)   X 
Naco POE (L2) X X 
San Pedro Valley (L3) X X 
White Water (L2)   X 
Douglas POE (L1) X X 
San Bernardino Valley (L2) X   
Table 2. Identification and Classification of Illegal Routes 
 
Further, each drug and human smuggling route is identified in each defense layer, 
with its respective border security technology, as explained in Chapter IV.  Given the 
sensitivity of identifying the exact amounts of resources employed by the USBP, this 
model only identifies whether or not USBP has capability in a given area of interest.  For 
a better application of the ASB model, it is recommended to include the exact numbers of 
resources available in each layer of defense.  Use of resource data in the model 
determines the deterrence or prevention rate of illegal cross-border activity.  These 
equations and measures are explained in greater detail throughout this chapter. 
 
B. ARIZONA-SONORA BORDER (ASB) MODEL 
The ASB model is an analytic model that incorporates factors relevant to the 
problem of illegal cross-border activity in the USBP Tucson Sector.  While a model can 
never fully reflect the true complexity of illegal cross-border activity factors, the 
approach described in this thesis draws from the notion that illegal cross-border activity 
has some structural features that lend themselves to analytical modeling.  In other words, 
illegal cross-border activity is not a random event, but yet organized and structured 
occurrences, and can be modeled as shown in this thesis. 
49 
This ASB model is to assist policymakers and operational planners to address the 
problem of illegal cross-border activity in a logical and systematic approach.  The 
mathematical model can help organize, articulate and analyze the essential problems in 
the USBP Tucson Sector.  The ASB model provides insight into the complex 
interdependencies that exist in establishing and maintaining control of the international 
border with Mexico.  It captures the interactions among the location and intensity of 
cross-border activities, apprehension rates and migration rates.  This model is an attempt 
to offer a mathematical solution to the problem of optimal deployment of border security 
resources in the USBP Tucson Sector along the ASB. 
There are 13 illegal routes, as shown in Figure 7, that lead illegal border crossers 
into one of the three possible defense layers denoted L1, L2 and L3, as described in 
Chapter IV.  As depicted in Figure 7, routes 1-4, 8 and 10 cross the border in layer 3 of 
the USBP operational structure, routes 5-7, 9, 11 and 13 cross the border in layer 2 of the 
USBP operational structure and routes 6 and 12 cross in the urban area or layer 1 of the 
USBP operational structure.  (Figure 7 denotes layer 0. This is the area in which the 
border security efforts of USBP are no longer present.)  As any model, the ASB model 
makes several assumptions.  This model only looks at the effectiveness of USBP to 
apprehend IBC once in the border zone; therefore it assumes that the migrant was not 
deterred from entering into the U.S.  In addition, it takes into consideration that 
smugglers use different means to travel from the border to their destination and therefore 
migrants move at different speeds.  However, on average it takes a migrant from the ASB 
to Phoenix, Arizona (L0) anywhere between four to five days.86  Therefore, the ASB 
model deduces that the USBP window of apprehension is five days from the day the 
migrant entered the border zone.  For simplification purposes, the model will assume an 
IBC always moves from a lower layer of defense to a higher level.  This assumption 
draws from the “balloon effect,” defined in Chapter III, where IBCs move from areas of 
significant enforcement to areas of lower enforcement. In other words, an IBC will not 
voluntarily move from a lower risk area to a higher one. 
 
                                                
86 Migrant in discussion with the author, Altar, Sonora, June 7, 2005. 
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Figure 7.   Systematic Picture of the 13 Identified Illegal Routes into the USBP Tucson 
Sector 
 
Given the above, the ASB model presumes that depending on the route the IBC 
chooses to enter the U.S. they will be subject to one, two or three layers of USBP defense 
alignment.  For example, if an IBC chooses to enter the U.S. through route five, then that 
IBC will only be exposed to USBP’s layers two and three.  Likewise, if the IBC opts for 
route two, then the IBC will only experience USBP’s third layer of defense. 
Consequently, the ASB model assumes that in the first day the migrant enters the U.S. at 
a designated layer of defense, as depicted in Figure 8, three things can happen within that 
five-day period: 
1. The migrant is apprehended; 
2. The migrant remains within that layer of defense; or  




Figure 8.   Arizona-Sonora Border Model Diagram 
 
At the same time, this model answers the question:  given the distribution of IBCs 
across the 13 routes and given the migration rate (ε), how should USBP allocate border 
security resources in the most effective way?  In order to answer this question the ASB 
model presumes that the apprehension rate (β) is directly related to the effective mixture 
of USBP assets in the interested area, this is explained in greater detailed later in this 
chapter.  Lastly, the model’s measures the border security system’s effectiveness by the 
number of IBC’s that remain in the system (without apprehension) for more than five 
days or traveled sufficiently north to be outside the border zone, L1 – L3.  Table 3 provides 





 Number of IBCs in Layer i at time t.       i=1,…,3 
j
i
I (t) Number of IBCs that attempt to cross the border using route j in 




!  Apprehension probability of IBCs who entered through route j at 
level Li 
i
!  The rate at which IBCs move from Li to Li+1 
i
m  USBP force size at Li off the border 
j
i
m  USBP force size at the border in route j and Li 
Fi The effect of the mix of USBP assets on the apprehension 
probability in Li 
( (1),..., ( ))
i i i
n! ! !=  Resources vector in Li (e.g., helicopters, UAVs, vehicles,…) 
( (1),..., ( ))j j j
i i i
n! ! !=  Resources vector deployed at the border in route j and Li  
Table 3. Notation Legend for the Arizona-Sonora Border Model 
 
1. Modeling Equations 
The ASB model provides a forecast for the number of apprehensions at each layer 
of defense, given the migration pattern and the deployed mix of resources.  This model 
can provide a general picture of the entire Sector or a specific picture of an area of 
interest, such as a route or series of routes.  In this thesis, the analysis and description of 
the ASB model addresses the general picture within each layer of defense.  The model 
captures a “snap-shot” of the situation, that it, it addresses the following question: “How 
many IBCs, out of N(1) IBCs that entered the US on a given day (t=1) are still at large 5 
days later?” Therefore, the model does not project actual numbers of IBCs, but rather the 
success rate of the USBP as a function of the infiltration and migration patterns and the 
resources mix. 
The first layer of the USBP operational structure is an urban area, also referred to 
as a “safe haven” for the IBC because the migrant has a better chance of blending in with 
the community.  This is an additional challenge the USBP faces despite the higher level 
of enforcement in the urban area.  Therefore, at time t, t=2,…, the number of IBCs in L1 
is equal to the number of IBCs in that layer at time t-1 minus those who were 
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apprehended or migrated to L2. Recall that the only routes that enter L1 are 6 and 12. 
Thus, 




NNN +=  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )6 6 12 121 1 1 1 1 1 1( 1) 1 1 1 1 1N t N t N t! " ! "= # # # + # # #  t=2,… (1) 
Where )(1 tN  is the number of IBCs in L1 at any unit of time, t87; 
( )1
1
!tN  is the number of IBCs in L1 at time, t-1; 
( )j
1
1 !"  is the fraction of IBCs present in L1 in route j that were not apprehended;  
)1( 1!"  is the fraction of IBCs not apprehended in L1 that did not leave the area; 
To simplify the model exposition, we track the IBCs according to their entry route 
j and then sum up over the relevant routes, as demonstrated in Equation 1. Thus, 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )1 1 11 1 1 1 1 2,3j j j j ji i i i i i iN t N t N t i! " ! "# # #= # # # + # # =    (2) 
Where ( )j
i
N t  is the number of IBCs, who crossed the border through route j, present in 
Li at time t. 
When the USBP border security system is successfully bypassed, this means that 
the IBCs have crossed the border zone reaching far enough north where USBP is no 
longer present and have avoided USBP apprehension.  In this model this area is denoted 
by L0.  It is important to note that all IBCs must have successfully crossed the third layer 
of USBP operational structure prior to escaping apprehension and arriving to L0, 
therefore, the number of IBCs who successfully “overrun” the border security system 
during the five day scenario is: 
( ) ( )( )( )
4 13
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Where 0 (5)N  is the total number of IBCs in L0 on the fifth day of the scenario. 
                                                
87 The unit of time is one day. 
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It must be noted that not all IBCs who attempt to reach their final destination L0 in 
the U.S. outside of the border security zone will achieve such goal within the five-day 
period analyzed in the ASB model.  Consequently, the final number of total IBCs illegal 
in the U.S on the fifth day is: 








= +!!       (4) 
The apprehension rate !  depends on the size of the USBP manpower force (m) 
and the resources vector (θ) available to the USBP agents, such as air support, horses, 
SUVs, bicycles, quads, cameras, and night-goggles, among many others. This can be 
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The function j
i
F defined on the set of the USBP assets, represents the effect of the 
mix of assets on the apprehension probability in Li.  This function can be estimated from 





C. MODEL EXTENSION AND APPLICATION 
As with any mathematical model, the ASB model does not reflect the real 
complexities present along the border.  Yet, the model provides insight into improving 
the current border security system.  Before adapting the variables, parameters and 
coefficients of this model, it is important to explain the applicability of this model to the 
real life of border security. 
For certain situations, it is important to consider the different types of IBCs, and 
their respective strengths and weaknesses.  Each type of IBC uses different tactics to 
enter the U.S.  As previously mentioned, there are guides, who recruit, transport, and 
direct potential drug smugglers and/or groups of unauthorized migrants across the border. 
They operate in staging areas in Mexico and link up with mounted smugglers or scouts 
across border.  Their strengths include:  possession of weapons, communication ability on 
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both sides of the border, proven tactics, and knowledge of areas of “sanctuary” or “safe 
heavens” on both sides of the border.  However, their weaknesses include: large footprint 
trails resulting from traveling groups, the necessity to cross through the USBP border 
security zone constantly on trips into and out of the U.S., and the need to operate in a 
clandestine manner within safe areas in support of operation. 
Scouts make up a sub-group of illegal smugglers, who establish observation posts 
along ridgelines and serve as lookouts to warn drug or human smugglers as to the 
presence of the USBP.  The scouts possess weapons and night vision and 
communications devices as they utilize proven tactical procedures.  They occupy the high 
grounds to take tactical advantage of the topography.  Yet, they function with limited re-
supply capabilities, restricted transportation access, and static positions close to border. 
Another type of IBC is a drug smuggler.  The drug smugglers enter the U.S. to 
conduct “drops” of prepackaged drugs.  They are usually unarmed and will abandon drug 
packages if spotted by the USBP.  They utilize multiple avenues of approach, the element 
of surprise, and proven tactical procedures.  Yet, because drug smugglers serve as 
“mules” within the drug world, they are unarmed and bear heavy loads (40 lbs) of 
prepackaged drugs, they are low-ranking members of the drug organization and they are 
not read into mission plan.  Additionally, they have limited to no communications. 
The most common known IBCs are the known economic migrants, who illegally 
enter the U.S. with support from guides.  Economic migrants, with the help of guides, 
utilize multiple avenues of approach, an element of surprise, and proven tactical 
procedures.  Their biggest strength is that they tend to travel in large numbers, making it 
more difficult for USBP to apprehend the large group at once, however their weakness is 
that by traveling in groups makes them more detectable by USBP.  When migrants notice 
USBP in the area, they scatter requiring more USBP resources to detain migrants from 
remaining unauthorized in the U.S.  Similar to the drug mule, they are unarmed.  In 
addition, they possess no re-supply capabilities.  Further, they usually require a guide, 
they have limited access to transportation, and they lack knowledge of the natural hazards  
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in the desert or the topography.  Finally, economic migrants tend to be unknowledgeable 
of the actual distance to their final destination and, therefore, are many times ill-prepared 
to walk for four or five days across the desert. 
The ASB model can be extended to account for the variations associated with 
each specific IBC group.  The above equations can be subscripted where, for example, 
.
j
i kN  can refer to a specific type k of IBCs, such as an economic migrant crossing through 
route j in layer Li,.  Likewise, ,
j
i k!  reflects the efficiency of the border security to deal 
with IBCs of type k.  These characteristics are important in relation to the migration rate 
of the different IBCs.  For example, a drug mule-traveling rate is slower than of an 
economic migrant.  This is because a drug mule will be carrying the drugs across the 
border.  A sack of marijuana typically is forty pounds.  Let’s assume that the drug mule is 
carrying forty pounds of marijuana on its back; on the other hand, the economic migrant 
carries a backpack and water, maybe up to ten pounds.  The difference in weight will 
either increase or decrease the IBCs migration rate.  Another factor to take into 
consideration is the terrain, particularly the number of canyons the IBCs will need to 
travel through in order to reach their destination:  the more rugged the terrain the slower 
the IBC’s migration rate. For example the terrain along route 5 is much more rugged than 
along route 11.  Route 5 is filled with steep canyons and high hills, where route 11 is 
more of a flat plain.  The topography can facilitate or impede travel as well as provide 
“safe havens” for the IBCs and the USBP. 
The ASB model is a “plug and play” type model that may assist in forecasting 
what may occur along the border within a five day window, given a certain IBCs 
distribution and USBP resource deployment.  The difficulty of acquiring current data 
from USBP caused the data to derive from older USBP apprehension statistics from 1994 
to 1999 in the USBP Tucson Sector.88  Given a certain distribution of IBCs across the 13 
routes and different migration rates, the question is: how USBP Border Security 
resources should be deployed to be most effective?  Specifically, the model examines the 
effect of apprehension rates, which depend on the resources mix, on the number of IBCs 
                                                
88 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Apprehension 
Statistics, Tucson Sector.  Washington, D.C. (October 1994 -1999). 
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that successfully evade the USBP.  Given the functional relation F (see equation (5)), one 
can do the transformation to a desired deployment of resources. 
For purposes of this model’s application in this thesis, as shown in Tables 4, 5 and 
6, the following assumptions and inputs are used: 
• The distribution of IBCs among the 13 routes in one day is derived from 
USBP station monthly apprehension statistics from 1994 to 1999.89 (For 
the purpose of the numerical analysis we assume a total of 1000 IBCs). 
• The determination of the apprehension rate for each of the 13 routes is 
based on USBP station monthly apprehension statistics from 1994 to 
1999.90 
• The determination of the migration rates is subjective and is based on the 
author’s knowledge of the border.  The migration rates vary between .4, .5 
and .8 depending on the USBP operational layer, L1, L2 or L3, 
respectively.  It is assumed that the facility of migrants to travel would 
decrease in areas that have greater concentration of natural hazards, 
creating a greater difficulty to cross the terrain. 
The ASB model has a total of eleven parameters: eight apprehension rates (! ) 
and three migration rates (! ).  The eight apprehension rates correspond to eight USBP 
stations that cover certain subsets of the routes. Stations Nogales and Douglas are in L1 
and cover routes 6 and 12, respectively. Stations Nogales, Naco and Douglas are in L2 
and cover the routes subsets {5, 7}, {9} and {11, 13}, respectively.  Stations Ajo, Casa 
Grande, Tucson, Wilcox, and Naco are in L3 and cover the routes subsets {1}, {2, 3}, 
{4}, {8} and {10}, respectively. It is important to note that USBP Tucson and Wilcox 
Stations are farther north, in L3, therefore are located to apprehend IBCs as they travel 
north from the border.  The apprehension rates are associated with USBP stations rather 
than routes because of two reasons:  USBP data management and resource allocations.  
Each USBP station maintains apprehension data; intelligence analysis of this data then 
                                                
89 An illegal immigration demographic study claims that the percentage of migrants apprehended has a 
correlation ratio of .9 to the number of IBC in the area. [For more information see:  Thomas J. Espenshade, 
“Using INS Border Apprehension Data to Measure the Flow of Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S. 
– Mexico Frontier,” International Migration ReviewXXIX, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 545.] U.S. Department of 
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Apprehension Statistics, Tucson 
Sector.  Washington, D.C. (October 1994 -1999). 
90 As routes lead north migrants are entering new USBP stations’ areas of operation, as migrants leave 
one USBP layer to the next, averages of apprehension were calculated to determine a more accurate picture 
of the remaining number of IBCs in the border security zone in a five day period or are at large. U.S. 
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Apprehension Statistics, Tucson 
Sector.  Washington, D.C. (October 1994 -1999). 
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determines border security resources allocation to each layer of defense.  Since 
apprehension rates are related to the resource allocation in each area it is logical to 
associate them with USBP stations instead of routes.  It is important to note that resources 
and fungible across stations, but fixed for the Sector as a whole.  The ASB model allows 
policymakers and operational planners to reallocate resources within the Tucson Sector 
understanding that resources will shift from one station to another.  These analyses will 
provide a predictive picture of what will occur to the number of migrants within the 
border zone or still at large within a five-day window.  Similarly, the other parameter (i.e. 
migration rate) used in the ASB model assumes that the three migration rates are 
determined in each layer of defense.  As mentioned above, this assumption can be easily 
relaxed in a more detailed model. 
The distribution of the IBCs across the 13 routes is determined by USBP station 
apprehension percentages.  It has been asserted that the number of migrants apprehended 
has a strong correlation with the number of IBCs in the area.91  Therefore, this measure is 
reasonable given the unavailable empirical data of the actual number of IBCs. 
For the analysis to follow, as indicated above and in Tables 4, 5 and 6, the 
following base case is assumed: 
 




Table 4. ASB model Input Data:  Migration Rates in each USBP Operational Layer 
 
Routes Apprehension Rate 
6 .6 
12 .4 
                                                
91 Thomas J. Espenshade, “Using INS Border Apprehension Data to Measure the Flow of 
Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S. – Mexico Frontier,” International Migration Review 29, no.2 
(Summer 1995): 545. 
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5 and 7 .2 
9 .5 
11 and 13 .3 
1, 2 and 3 .8 
4 .6 
8 and 10 .1 
Average of 4, 8 and 10 .27 
Table 5. ASB model Input Data:  Migration Rates in each USBP Operational Layer 
 
As noted earlier the apprehension rates derive from USBP station statistics, some 
routes are within the same operational layer of a USBP station.  Therefore, the same 
apprehension rate was used for those routes, as shown in Table 5.  Also, as routes (5 – 7, 
9, 11-13) lead into the third operational layer, an average of the apprehension rates for 
routes (4, 8 and 10) are calculated for a more accurate apprehension rate as migrants 
move through the USBP operational structure. 
An analysis synthesis of the total number of IBCs still at large or remain in the 





Number of IBCs 
out of 1000 





1 L3 100 9.1 9.1% 
2 L3 60 5.5 9.1% 
3 L3 100 9.1 9.1% 
4 L3 200 42.6 21.3% 
5 L2 87 36.8 42.2% 
6 L1 30 2.7 9% 
7 L2 70 29.6 42.2% 
8 L3 60 48.1 80.1% 
9 L2 63 17.9 28.4% 
60 
10 L3 100 80.1 80.1% 
11 L2 50 22.9 45.8% 
12 L1 40 9.6 24% 
13 L2 80 36.7 45.8% 
Table 6. ASB model Input Data:  IBC Distribution among the 13 routes and number of 
IBCs evaded according to the ASB model. 
 
Next we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to some key parameters.  
Figures 9, 10, and 11 show the effect of varying apprehension and migration rates on the 
total number of IBCs that evade in five days the USBP system. The analysis is focused 
on routes {12}, {5 and 7}, and {8 and 10}, respectively.  These routes present the highest 
percentage of IBCs that evade USBP in the border zone, given the parameters identified 
in Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
Figure 9 identifies the analysis for route 12; the graph demonstrates the effect of 
migration rates on apprehension in L1; as the migrants move faster the USBP ability to 
apprehend decreases.  In addition, note the intersection point at around .15! = ; for low 
apprehension probabilities in L1 lower migration rates result in higher rate of USBP 
avoidance, while the opposite is true for higher apprehension rates at that level.  
Therefore there are two situations: 
• If the probability of apprehension in a certain area is low, and the IBC 
chooses to stay longer in the border zone, the migrant will have a greater 
probability of avoiding USBP. 
•  If the probability of apprehension in a certain area is high, and the 
migrant chooses to stay longer in the border zone, the migrant will have a 
greater probability of being apprehended by USBP. 
The same holds true for the analysis of routes 5 and 7 in USBP second layer of 
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Figure 9.   Number of IBCs that avoid USBP as a function of the apprehension and migration 
rates in Route 12, L1. 
 
The second layer of defense includes routes 5 and 7.  The analysis for this layer of 
defense takes into consideration that USBP uses a concentric and tiered operational 
structure; therefore routes 5 and 7 are within the same station’s area of responsibility.  
This indicates that resources employed in the second layer are shared and therefore we 
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Figure 10.   Number of IBCs that avoid USBP as a function of the apprehension and migration 
rates in Routes 5 and 7, L2. 
 
It is important to note that a slower migration rate is used for the second layer of 
defense given that the topography does not include an urban area and migrants are 
exposed to canyons and desert.  Figure 10 demonstrates that USBP effectiveness in L2 is 
lower than in L1; demonstrating that as the migrant’s traveling rate increases USBP’s 
probability to apprehend IBCs is decreases compared to the first layer of defense. 
For the third layer of defense, as with the second layer of defense, the analysis 
took into consideration that USBP uses a concentric and tiered operational structure.  
This indicates that resources employed in the third layer are shared.  The third layer of 
defense’s terrain is the most desolate and rugged compared to L1 and L2.  In this layer 
migrants are exposed to many natural hazards.  Therefore, a slower migration rate was 
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Figure 11.   Number of IBCs that avoid USBP as a function of the apprehension and migration 
rates in Route 8 and 10, L3. 
 
Unlike Figures 9 and 10, Figure 11 demonstrates the effect of migration rates on 
USBPs’ ability to apprehend in L3; as the migrants move faster the USBP capability to 
apprehend remains fairly the same.  The third layer of defense is not comprised of “safe 
heavens” or urban infrastructure for migrant’s desire to remain in this area for long 
periods of time.  Therefore, migrants will continue to travel until their destination, as the 
migrant moves at a faster speed USBP ability to apprehend decreases by very little.  If 
this is the case, then the question is why is the probability of apprehension less than in the 
second layer of defense?  This can be due to the challenges USBP faces to access and 
conquer all areas of the vast terrain, which is very difficult.  In addition, the third layer of 
defense does not have “on the line” USBP resources.  Therefore, migrants have a greater 
chance of avoiding USBP if entering the U.S. through this operational layer, but will be 
exposing themselves to a greater number of natural hazards. 
The ASB model does not provide a solution to the current situation; instead it is a 
descriptive model to identify potential outcomes given the distribution of IBCs and USBP 
resources.  From this analysis it is clear that the second layer is the least effective of the 
three layers currently used by USBP Tucson Sector.  The applicability of the ASB model 
is to identify what is the outcome that the U.S. government expects from the USBP given 
the limitation of resources.  This model will attempt to predict the amount of resources 
and the distribution of such in order to reach maximum apprehension of IBCs. 
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Given that the ASB is only a small portion of the international border, this model, 
with the appropriate modifications, can be applied to any peaceful geopolitical boundary 
subject to illegal cross-border activity.  This model attempts to assist operational and 
strategic policy-makers in their efforts to determine how to optimally deploy resources to 
improve efficiency.  Resources will always be limited and therefore must be meticulously 
allocated to provide the most benefit.  This model draws from U.S. Department of 
Defense theories; such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield and border control 
models to counter-guerrilla insurgencies with the understanding the USMB is a peaceful 
border.  Consequently, these theories have been significantly modified when applied to 
the realities of the Southwest border. 
Current border statistics from the USBP must be input into the ASB model in 
order to determine optimal deployment of current border security resources in the USBP 
Tucson Sector.  This research did not have access to the complete USBP border data, and 
therefore, simply considered different cases to determine efficiency of the model.  In 
conclusion, this model identified that an efficient border security system must be 
accompanied by an efficient internal enforcement system.  No border security system can 
be effective on its own, because there will always be a small number of migrants that will 
succeed at illegal entry.  Therefore, an internal enforcement system is vital to bridge the 
gap and aim to reduce, rather than eliminate, the numbers of those IBCs who eventually 
achieve entry into the U.S. illegally.  The following chapter of this thesis is a conclusion 




Post September 11, 2001, border security became part of a greater national vision 
of protecting the homeland from the potential entry of terrorists and weapons of mass 
destruction.  The traditional concerns of illegal cross-border activity of rising crime in 
border communities, a drain on social resources, and economic concerns was augmented 
by the fear of another terrorist attack on U.S. soil.  The USMB is a vast and rugged 
territory, which requires substantial resources in order to harden the border security 
system. 
The incomplete implementation of the USBP national border security strategy and 
a lack of resources have resulted in the growing problem of illegal cross-border activity 
along the USMB.  Elected officials and policy-makers continue to disagree as to the 
appropriate solution needed to address the challenges along the Southwest border, be they 
law enforcement or humanitarian.  In the meantime, many lives are lost and communities 
suffer, while international relations become tenser.  While some governmental policy 
decisions (i.e. Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Hold-the-Line) alleviated illegal 
immigration, bettered relations with Mexico and decreased crime in San Diego and El 
Paso, at the same time these same decisions relocated the problem to other vulnerable and 
porous areas along the border.  It is clear that the U.S. faces many challenges in its efforts 
to tackle illegal cross-border activity:  limited financial and personnel resources, 
numerous the layers of federal, state, local, and tribal government, and diverse cultural 
and human dimensions. 
Like criminal activity within our communities, law enforcement of illegal cross-
border activity is subject to the balloon effect, as evidenced by Operation Gatekeeper and 
Operation Hold-the-Line in San Diego and El Paso, respectively.  The consequences of 
the San Diego and El Paso Operations resulted in an increase in illegal crossing at the 
ASB – now the largest area of illegal border crossing traffic in the nation.  The USBP 
Tucson Sector divided the area of operation among 8 border stations with each 
responsible for a section within the sector. 
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While the efforts of Congress and the USBP continue, the illegal immigration 
problem persists.  The current deployment and employment of resources must be 
revisited to increase efficiency and alleviate the challenges along the USMB.  The 
application of force along the border without the proper use of intelligence to modify the 
use of force in a timely and adequate manner along the USMB could potentially 
accelerate the “balloon effect.”  Therefore, this thesis proposes the use of the ASB model 
or a similar border model to allow strategists to minimize the geographical displacement 
effects prior to applying force along the USMB.  The appropriate employment and 
deployment of border security resources can minimize illegal cross-border activity and 
the border’s vulnerabilities. 
Along the Southwest border, this year chronicled a record number of migrant 
deaths in the desert – over 400 deaths along the Southwest border, an alarming 
humanitarian concern that only adds to the reasons to examine the international border.92  
This research presents a neutral, mathematical proposal aimed at alleviating the 
challenges along the ASB.  It is clear that illegal cross-border activity is not the cause of 
random events, instead of organized and thought-out efforts by IBCs.  Given this notion, 
the challenges of the USMB can be tackled logically and through the use of mathematical 
models.  This thesis studies and applies the complexities of the different variables and 
parameters of illegal cross-border activity through the use of the ASB model.  The ASB 
model is only one small portion of the international border and presents a starting point 
for policymakers and operational planners in addressing the ASB. 
Through the research and this thesis it became clear that USBP must be using 
mathematical models to tackle border issues.  However, if this is the true and given that 
there are many stakeholders in border security efforts, particularly because the 
international boundary is surrounded by private, local, tribal and state land, which all are 
partners in securing the homeland.  A partnership begins through sharing ideas, therefore 
it is important for the USBP begin to share such models and develop joint strategies with 
the stakeholders.  This will produce results from modeling the USMB leading to the 
potential social benefits, identified in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.  The below results and 
                                                
92 Ioan Grillo, “U.S. border bill blasted by Mexican government,” Arizona Republic Newspaper, 
(December 17, 2005). 
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benefits are not the direct cause and effect of each other, per se.  Instead, the results and 
benefits illustrate a combined policy and operational effort in securing the border that can 
be drawn from the proper use of a model such as the ASB, to develop logical and 
effective policy. 
 
Modeling the USMB 
Optimal border security resource deployment; 
The understanding and forecast of IBCs patterns and activities 
Funding optimization, therefore, providing more resources to allocate in other 
geographical areas or programs; 
Minimize illegal cross-border activity; 
A mathematical model which can be replicated and successfully applied first in other 
USBP sectors 
Table 7. Modeling the USMB Summary 
 
Social Benefits 
Decrease the number of deaths of IBCs in the desert; 
Decrease crime in general;  
Improving the quality of life border communities; 
Increasing security and economic prosperity within the border region; 
Improved international relations in general 
Table 8. Social Benefits Summary 
 
The ASB model demonstrates that by increasing border security enforcement efforts, 
it may augment humanitarian concerns along the USMB.  As migrants move away from 
high enforcement areas to low enforcement areas, in other words, they move away from 
areas where the border security enforcement is more effective, and are thus exposed to 
greater natural hazards.  Therefore, as operational planners and policy makers develop 
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new strategies, these humanitarian concerns and consequences need to be taken into 
consideration in order to reduce deaths in the desert and improve bi-national relations 
with Mexico. 
A secure homeland is only possible through the collaboration and shared 
resources of all stakeholders at all levels of government with the integration of 
intelligence in order to prevent and protect the nation.  Accordingly, Secretary Michael 
Chertoff states, “[i]n our complex free society, there is no perfect solution to address 
every security concern. But by working together collectively to analyze threats, 
understand our capabilities, and apply resources intelligently, we can manage risk.”93  
Therefore, beyond the identified results and benefits presented above, there is a dire need 
to input human intelligence data on existing activities and the use of the existing border 
security resources into the ASB model.  The introduction of human intelligence data is a 
vital component in ensuring that the model is updated and applicable to the current 
situation faced by the USBP along the affected area. 
As USBP assets increase along the border, the model will become more complex.  
Another contributing factor, as described earlier, is that Coyotes adapt tactics and 
techniques to the USBP strategies and operations.  The constant input of updated human 
intelligence data into the model will ensure optimization of resources, even in a changing 
environment, through a forecast of illegal cross-border activity along the USMB.  It is 
recommended that the USBP intelligence unit work closer with USBP Mexico Liaison 
units to receive more updated information in regards to smuggler staging area tactics.  
The U.S. government may consider identifying an agency or a unit within USBP to 
constantly maintain and continue analysis of the USMB; this unit is to collaborate with 
all stakeholders.  This collaborative group is to develop policies and ensure proper 
implementation and complementary policy that is productive and prevents illegal cross-
border activity. 
                                                
93 Michael Chertoff, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Secretary, “Interim National 
Preparedness Goal,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Press Release (April 1, 2005). 
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